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Pandora’s Ballot Box, Or A Proxy With Moxie? The Majority 
Voting Amendments to Delaware Corporate Law 
 
Jay Verret1a
“The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which 
serves as a nexus for contracting relationships and which is also characterized 
by the existence of divisible residual claims …and…which can generally be 
sold without permission of the other contracting individuals.” 
 
Michael Jensen and William Meckling 
Theory of the Firm 
 
"You own the company. That's right -- you, the stockholder. And you are all 
being royally screwed over by these, these bureaucrats, with their luncheons, 
their hunting and fishing trips, their corporate jets and golden parachutes." 
 
Gordon Gekko (Played by Michael Douglas) 
Annual Stockholders Meeting of Teldar Paper 
The Movie Wall Street 
The Delaware General Assembly has recently adopted an amendment 
to the Delaware General Corporation Law which provides that where 
shareholders have adopted a majority voting bylaw for corporate elections over 
the traditional plurality scheme, a corporation may not subsequently amend its 
bylaws to return to plurality voting without shareholder approval.  I will 
compare this provision to other approaches and try to explain the reasons 
underlying its adoption.  I will also briefly summarize the evolving shareholder 
empowerment debate and analyze the majority voting provision in the context 
of that discussion.  I will describe some unique and unanticipated interactions 
between majority voting bylaws and various other working parts of corporation 
and securities law affecting the shareholder franchise, a carefully protected right 
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in Delaware jurisprudence.1 The most prevalent corporate strategies 
responding to this movement will be explored and the difficulties of 
implementing majority voting will be described. Finally, I will analyze voting 
schemes from the political sphere in an attempt to find analogous lessons for the 
corporate arena.  I will then end with some predictions about future 
developments which will hinge on the outcome of SEC rules proposals, further 
DGCL revisions, and the responses of Delaware incorporated entities. 
This piece blends three distinct groups of thought: i) Theoretical 
corporate law scholarship and financial regulatory theory, ii) Interpretation of 
Delaware Chancery Court cases, and iii) Practical analysis on the future of the 
majority voting movement and the strategic choices facing board of directors in 
the aftermath of the Delaware amendments and corollary SEC and NYSE 
regulatory initiatives. 
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II. The Genesis of the Majority Voting Amendment and a Comparison 
to Other Regulatory Approaches 
A. Development of Withhold Vote Campaigns by Institutional Investors 
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D. Alternative Regulatory Schemes 
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V. Brewing a Perfect Storm---SEC proxy reform, NYSE Exchange Rule 
452, and Internet Proxy Solicitation. 
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1 See Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. v. JCC Holding Co., 802 A.2d 294, 311 (Del. Ch. 
2002). 
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VII. An Analysis of Voting Outcomes Using an Analogy to Political 
Science 
VIII. Conclusion and Predictions 
 
I. A Summary of the Statutory Changes 
 
An analysis of Delaware corporate law must necessarily begin with 
Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) 141, “The business and 
affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be 
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors”.2 The DGCL 
further provides that, in the absence of a bylaw to the contrary, directors 
shall be elected by a plurality of the votes cast.3 Plurality voting means 
that the candidates receiving the greatest number of affirmative votes 
cast, limited by the number of seats up for election, is victorious in that 
election.  Thus it would be possible for an uncontested candidate to 
receive one vote in favor, and millions of no or “withhold” votes, and 
still emerge victorious in the election.  Since corporate elections are not 
subject to a runoff process, and shareholders are able to nominate rival 
candidates for corporate elections, the plurality default was adopted in 
response to the potential situation in which no nominee was able to 
obtain a majority of the votes cast, thus resulting in a failed election.4
Under the DGCL, the bylaws of a corporation may contain any 
provision not in conflict with the DGCL, and may be adopted by the 
shareholders, or, if given the power to do so in the corporate charter, the 
board of directors.5 A recent addition to section 216 and the subject of 
this article, adopted in August of 2006, specifies that “A bylaw 
amendment adopted by stockholders which specifies the votes that shall 
be necessary for the election of directors shall not be further amended or 
repealed by the board of directors.”6 This effectively means that a 
shareholder approved change to the default plurality voting standard 
 
2 8 Del.C. § 141. 
38 Del.C. § 216 states “In the absence of such specification in the certificate of 
incorporation or bylaws of the corporation: . . . (3) Directors shall be elected by a 
plurality of the votes of the shares present in person or represented by proxy at the 
meeting and entitled to vote on the election of directors.” 
4See American Bar Association, Committee on Corporate Laws Discussion Paper  1506 
PLI/Corp 473, *506 (2005).  Citing S. 93 134th Gen. Assembly, 66 Del. Laws ch. 136, 
§ 11 (1987), reprinted in 2 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, 
DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, § 
216. 
5 8 Del.C. § 109(b). 
6 8 Del.C. § 216. 
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cannot be unilaterally altered by the board without shareholder 
ratification.   
 
DGCL 141 also provides that “Any director or the entire board of 
directors may be removed, with or without cause, by the holders of a 
majority of the shares then entitled to vote at an election of directors”, 
but then subjects that provision to the following exception: “(1) Unless 
the certificate of incorporation otherwise provides, in the case of a 
corporation whose board is classified as provided in subsection (d) of 
this section, shareholders may effect such removal only for cause.”7 The 
obvious result is that nearly all corporate charters will allow removal 
(between elections) by a majority of shareholders only for cause, thus 
requiring some alternative means for removal of a director.  
Furthermore, in any event, a removed director continues to serve until a 
replacement can be nominated and elected under the “holdover” rule.8
Another recent addition to the DGCL, relevant to this exploration, is 
the advance resignation provision providing that “A resignation which 
is conditioned upon the director failing to receive a specified vote for 
reelection as a director may provide that it is irrevocable.”9 The 
statutorily protected permanence of such a board policy may fall in line 
with an emerging trend toward holding boards firmly to their 
representations to their shareholders in Delaware courts.10 
II. The Genesis of the Majority Voting Amendment and a Comparison 
to Other Regulatory Approaches 
 
A. Development of Withhold Vote Campaigns by Institutional Investors 
and the Grey Line between Symbolic and Pyrrhic Victories 
 
Former SEC Commissioner Joseph Grundfest initially proposed the 
use of withhold vote campaigns in a law review article in 1993.11 At the 
time, the active takeover market of the 80s was killed by a cocktail of 
poison pills, antitakeover legislation, and diminished access to capital; 
takeovers could no longer be used to control management excess and 
 
7 8 Del. C. § 141 (k). 
8 8 Del. C. § 141(b). 
9 8 Del. C. § 141(b). 
10 See, e.g., Unisuper Ltd. v. News Corp., 2005 WL 3529317, at *5(Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 
2005).  Compare Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc. 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003); 
Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).   
11 See Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with
Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1993). 
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urge boards to respond to shareholder discontent.12 Proxy fights were 
also of marginal utility because the institutional investors who could 
lead the charge suffered from a collective action problem.13 Grundfest’s 
proposal was to use withhold votes as a mechanism whereby investors 
could communicate dissatisfaction with a board at low cost.14
Compared to the enormous expense of running an independent proxy 
fight, investors, both institutional and otherwise, would find that a 
withhold vote campaign would be more capable of sustaining 
momentum.15 
SEC proxy rules require that a proxy allow for withhold votes, or an 
instruction to not vote for a management slate even if they are running 
unopposed.16 In compliance, the proxy may include (i) a “withhold” 
box next to the name of each nominee, or (ii) an instruction in bold face 
type that a voter may strike through a name to vote against the 
nominee, or (iii) designated blank spaces in which the voter is permitted 
to enter names of nominees for which they intend to withhold a vote, or 
(iv) any other similar means, provided that clear instructions are 
furnished indicating how the security holder may withhold authority to 
vote for any nominee.17 
Many have since challenged the usefulness of withhold vote 
campaigns.18 However, Grundfest urged that they would provide 
institutional investors with the facility to negotiate with boards 
concerned about the prospect of becoming a target.19 Grundfest 
reasoned that board members taking the job out of a desire for prestige 
would want to avoid the negative publicity20 surrounding a withhold 
 
12 Id. at 934. 
13 Grundfest cites three iterations of the institutional investor collective action problem:, 
rational apathy where each discounts the marginal effectiveness of individually joining 
the group, a game-theory type dilemma whereby each individual has an incentive to 
free ride, and the difficulty of finding a homogenous result that they can all agree on 
with the attendant costs of communicating among shareholders in the group.  Id. at 909.  
Also explored in more detail in Section III B infra. 
14 Id. at 866. 
15 Id. at 909. 
16 SEC Rule 14-a4(b)(2); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14. 
17 SEC Rule 14-a4(b)(2); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14 
18 Diane Del Guercio, Laura Wallis & Tracey Woidtke, Do Board Members Pay 
Attention When Institutional Investors ‘Just Say No’?, (June 2005) (unpublished 
manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=575242).  
19 Grundfest, supra, at 865. 
20 That negative publicity would be facilitated by the SEC’s directive that the results of 
corporate elections, including a tally of withhold votes, be publicly disclosed.  17 
C.F.R. 240.14a-1 to 240.14a-7, 240.14a-10. 
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vote campaign.21 A looming withhold vote would also give directors 
more of an incentive and justification to challenge a domineering CEO.22 
Or, in the aftermath of a withhold vote, takeover artists may smell 
weakness and be more willing to run the gauntlet of a tender offer (with 
its attendant proxy fight and risk of expensive litigation).  He also raises 
the possibility of the Chancery Court enhancing its review of a board’s 
decision not to withdraw a poison pill in response to a tender on the 
heels of a successful withhold vote campaign.23 Grundfest notes that, as 
a signal without the necessity of legally binding effect, withhold votes 
would not even need to obtain a majority vote to be useful.24 
Majority voting is the true progeny of the withhold vote movement.  
This is because majority voting turns a symbolic withhold vote into an 
effective vote of “no” (which otherwise does not appear on the 
corporate proxy). Seeing the effectiveness of withhold vote campaigns 
when they were merely a symbolic gesture, institutional investors have 
lately moved to make withhold votes into a more effective negotiating 
tool by supporting majority voting in certain circumstances.25 
B. Case in Point: The Disney Withhold Vote Campaign; It’s is a small 
world after all, Mr. Eisner 
 
Michael Eisner, former Chairman and CEO of the Walt Disney Co., 
faced a number of challenges in his final years at the helm.26 Due to 
these ongoing problems, ISS recommended shareholders withhold their 
votes for his unopposed election as director of Disney.  A number of 
large institutional investors followed suit, resulting in a 43% withhold 
 
21 Grundfest, supra, at 927-930. 
22 Id. at 930. 
23 Id. at 935.  See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 
1985), Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 286-92 (Del. Ch. 1989). 
24 Grundfest, supra, at 913.  This prediction ultimately proved to be quite prescient.  
See, e.g., withhold vote campaigns at Safeway, Inc., Disney, Inc., and Home Depot.  
Mentioned in Stephen Deane, Majority Voting, From the Symbolic to the Democratic,
Institutional Shareholder Services Center for Corporate Governance (2005) [hereinafter 
ISS Report].   
25 Former Chancellor William Allen observed that just voting no is “like chicken soup; 
it couldn’t hurt, and what if it helps?”  See Grundfest, supra, at 868, citing a “Private 
Communication with Chancellor William T. Allen (Mar. 6, 1992).” at fn 40.  Perhaps, 
as we shall see, majority voting is the spice to liven the soup up a bit.  However, with 
corollary SEC and NYSE action, perhaps too many cooks will also spoil the broth. 
26 Phyllis Furman, Joy in the Mouse House: Disney Shareholders Give Eisner Thumbs 
Up, N.Y. Daily News, Feb. 12, 2005.  For instance, Eisner was engaged in momentous 
litigation over the hiring of Michael Ovitz and had just lost Pixar Studios over what was 
arguable a personality conflict. 
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vote against Eisner.27 The Board responded by forcing Eisner to step 
down as Chairman,  and he eventually left Disney when his contract 
expired.  Here, no majority voting bylaw was in effect (although Disney 
has since adopted a majority voting regime for uncontested elections), 
Eisner managed to receive a majority of the votes cast, and the holdover 
rule would have still maintained his office until a replacement could be 
elected even if the vote had legal effect.  Further, he remained as CEO 
for the remainder of his contract.  Nevertheless, the board responded to 
the outcome by replacing him as Chairman.  If institutional investors 
were able to convince owners of 43% of the shares cast to withhold their 
votes when the result had no legal significance, then it is then 
conceivable that they could have come closer to breaking the 50% 
threshold when legal consequence are present.28 And if the Board of 
Directors responds to a vote result with no legal significance, then it is 
conceivable they would respond more strongly to one that does.  This 
proves that, even if later shown to be ill advised, the majority voting 
amendment to the DGCL is at least not irrelevant. 
 
C. Political Analysis of the Majority Voting Amendment; A Tour Inside 
the Corporate Law Factory. 
 
When viewed through the lens of the various academics that have 
sought to explain the process of how Delaware makes corporate law,29 
we can begin to understand the factors shaping the present amendment.  
 
27 See http://www.usatoday.com/money/media/2004-03-03-disney-shareholder-
meeting_x.htm. 
28 Absent broker street voting, the vote would have been a majority withhold vote.  See 
Section V B infra. 
29 See Lawrence A. Hamermesh,  The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, *1750 fn. 2, citing (“E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf 
Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over 
Corporate Charters, 112 Yale L.J. 553 (2002); William L. Cary, Federalism and 
Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663 (1974); Jill E. Fisch, The 
Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. 
Cin. L. Rev. 1061 (2000); Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: 
Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 913 (1982); Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of 
Corporate Reform, 29 J. Corp. L. 625 (2004); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, 
Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1573 
(2005); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate 
Law, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1908 (1998); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, 
Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 469 
(1987); Brett H. McDonnell, Two Cheers for Corporate Law Federalism, 30 J. Corp. L. 
99 (2004); Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 588 (2003) 
[hereinafter Roe, Delaware's Competition]; Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118 Harv. 
L. Rev. 2491 (2005) [hereinafter Roe, Delaware's Politics]; Roberta Romano, The State 
Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 Cardozo L. Rev. 709 (1987) [hereinafter 
Romano, Competition Debate]; Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder 
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251 (1977).”). 
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One can hardly call the Delaware response anything but conservative.  
The amendment merely says that, where shareholders adopt a majority 
voting bylaw, the board will not be able to unilaterally amend the 
bylaw.  Its corollary says that advance resignation letters conditioned on 
failure to get a majority vote are binding.  Shareholders’ ability to 
nominate directors was not enhanced, the plurality default was not 
altered.  This is consistent with Hamermesh’s three-fold observation 
that Delaware i) will not act in the absence of clear policy implication, 
ii)favors private parties ordering their own relations, and iii)always 
makes slow, conservative changes to corporate law when it is moved to 
make a change at all.30 The Delaware response allows shareholders and 
board to decide the election system they favor and merely makes such a 
decision concrete if shareholder approved. It was based on extensive 
discussion that began at the federal level and only lately provoked a 
muted response at the Delaware Committee on Corporate Laws.31 
Mark Roe has also explored in some depth the process by which 
Delaware Corporate Law evolves and the interest groups and goals 
shaping that evolution.32 In effect, he posits that in order to attract and 
maintain corporate franchise fees, Delaware will respond jointly to the 
interests of shareholders and management to the exclusion of other 
affected groups, as the ratification of both groups is required for re-
incorporation into or out of Delaware.33 Thus, when the two groups can 
agree, they get a quick change, and when they disagree the state will 
offer a moderated proposal that balances their interest.  Roe also argues 
that Delaware will be spurred to act where the threat of federal action is 
imminent, because once both groups have achieved a result in Delaware 
they will be unmotivated to move beyond the status quo to push for 
changes on the federal level, which might bring in other parties (e.g., 
Unions) who may advocate for a result that neither of them favor.34 
Thus Delaware is a place to pre-empt unwieldy and unpredictable 
federal reform.35 Delaware might also act to pre-empt in cases where 
national scandal make federal response likely.36 Furthermore, to make 
Delaware pre-emption of federal action more likely, Delaware will 
moderate its action to minimize the chances of federal ire.37 Consistent 
 
30 Hamermesh indeed uses the majority voting amendment as an example of his theory 
in action.  See Id. at 1773. 
31 Id. 
32 See generally Mark Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491 (June 5, 
2005); Mark Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (December 2003). 
33 Mark Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, at 2495 (June 5, 2005). 
34 Id. at 2513 
35 Id. at 2516 
36 Id. at  2516. 
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with that thesis, Former Chief Justice Veasy of the Delaware Supreme 
Court commented at an SEC roundtable discussion considering 
shareholder nominations that the Delaware Corporate Law’s Committee 
should consider adopting majority voting to pre-empt federal 
legislation.38
In order to fully understand the Roe hypothesis in the context of the 
majority voting amendment, we must also understand the interest 
groups involved.  For that, we need only look to the comment letters 
submitted to the committee whose task it was to study the proposal.  
The Council of Institutional Investors, a trade group representing large 
pension funds, wrote to the committee charged with examining the 
majority voting amendment to express its whole hearted support of 
majority voting as a new default standard for shareholder elections.39
Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS’), a proxy advisory firm that 
represents the interests of a broader group of institutional investors, also 
has exhibited support for majority voting.40 The U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, representing the interest of corporate management of 
Delaware Corporations, felt that there was no need for a present 
revision, but the businesses it represents were happy to institute board 
approved (and thus board revocable) bylaws or director resignation 
policies.  We can then view Delaware result as a mediation between the 
extremes.  The default rule of plurality voting wasn’t altered, despite the 
insistence of the CII and ISS, but bylaws that pass with shareholder 
approval are protected from board meddling.  Further, the director 
advance resignations that companies were already throwing corporate 
governance activists to keep the wolves at bay become permanent once 
 
37 Id. at 2513. 
38 Available at http://sec.gov/spotlight/dir-nominations/transcript03102004.txt (“And 
perhaps the Commission would want to consider if you want to adopt the provision you 
have on the table to create an exception for any state law that 
allows…majority…voting, for example, or any organic document of a corporation like 
the certificate of incorporation or bylaws be effective, to allow that, then this provision 
wouldn't apply to any such situation as that. I think it would be an interesting proposal 
for the Delaware legislative branch to consider through the good offices of the counsel 
of the Delaware State Bar Association Corporate Law's Committee, and there are 
others.”). 
39 Available at http://www.cii.org/library/correspondence/061705_mcbride.htm (“I am 
writing to you in your capacity as Chairman of the Corporation Law Section (the 
“Section”) of the Delaware State Bar Association to request that the Section consider 
recommending to the Delaware legislature an amendment to Section 216 of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”), 8 Del. C. § 216, to make majority 
voting for director elections the presumptive choice for Delaware corporations.”). 
40 In 2007, ISS plans to include the presence and strength of a company’s majority 
voting bylaw as an additional factor in the scoring systems it uses to rate the 
effectiveness of the company’s corporate governance effectiveness.  See 
http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/2007%20US%20Policy%20Update.pdf. 
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received.  Institutional investors and management each get a little 
something, reform is measured and narrowly tailored, and let the 
wheels of commerce continue to spin.   
 
In this case, the specter of corporate ballot reform is also looming on 
the federal level consistent with the Roe hypothesis.  After a failed effort 
at granting shareholders proxy access to the corporate ballot, the SEC is 
again considering a hotly contested proposal to allow shareholders 
access.41 A move to make majority voting bylaws resolute, once passed, 
could be a measure to minimize institutional shareholder interest in 
such a proposal.42 The present amendment doesn’t give unions the 
opportunity to place divisive directors onto the ballot, something they 
might achieve under a ballot access rule.  But it does allow institutional 
investors to send a message by voiding directors when they are 
dissatisfied with their performance.43 Additionally, one can see this as 
following in the scandal, seen among institutional investor advocacy 
groups, of the Eisner saga.  Excessive executive compensation and the 
last vestiges of post-Enron outrage have given advocates of investor 
democracy just enough fuel to bring this to the attention of federal 
regulators.  In that case, perhaps Delaware is hoping it can moderate the 
eventual federal response.44 Thus Hamermesh and Roe have shown us 
the raison de-etre for these amendments to the DGCL.  What remains to 
be seen is if they will, in their interaction with other regulatory powers, 
have the effect that was originally intended.   
 
41 TAKEOVER LAW AND PRACTICE 2006  1571 PLI/Corp 259, *380 (“See, e.g., 
Proxy Access: To Be or Not to Be? Thirteen Months after SEC Proposes Rule, 
Resolution is No Closer, 17 M&A Rep. 45 (Nov. 22, 2004) (noting that proxy access 
proposal received 16,000 comment letters, a record-breaking number); Judith Burns and 
Siobhan Hughes, SEC Chairman Sees "Consensus" on US Market Reforms, Dow Jones 
Newswires (Feb. 10, 2005) (quoting SEC Chairman William Donaldson as 
acknowledging that the SEC's original proxy access proposal "doesn't fly," is "too 
complicated," and that he would like to start over with "wholly new thoughts" on how 
to tackle the subject).”). 
42 Indeed, former Commissioner Grundfest wrote to the SEC to urge that majority 
voting is a proper alternative to corporate proxy access.  See ISS Report, supra, at 9. 
43 ISS lists three reasons for targeting individual directors for withhold vote campaigns: 
i)interlocking directorates involving key board committees ii)poor director attendance 
and iii)serving on too many boards.  They also cite 4 factors they use in targeting 
boards overall: i)ignoring majority votes on shareholder precatory proposals ii)payment 
of excessive non-audit fees iii)overlooking obvious boardroom conflicts and 
iv)adoption of dead-hand poison pills.  See ISS Report, supra, at iii.   
44 Roe, supra, at 2529.  This analysis does run the risk of a reverse-causation paradox.  
Does the SEC act because of a lack of attention in the DGCL?  Then does Delaware act 
to pre-empt the SEC?  And then does the Delaware action alter the SEC’s response?  
And here, we have a Delaware amendment related to an SEC proposal that previously 
failed to pass, but is subsequently being reconsidered due to a federal court ruling.  In 
the end, the portion of the Roe hypothesis regarding Delaware action in advance of 
federal pre-emption is helpful for analyzing this policy, but shouldn’t be taken to excess 
limits. 
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D. Alternative Regulatory Schemes 
 
1) The MBCA Recommendation 
 
The American Bar Association promulgates the Model Business 
Corporation Act (“MBCA”), which serves as a model corporate code 
utilized by most states (except, of course, Delaware).45 Though some 
groups advocated for an alteration to the plurality voting default found 
in the code, the Committee opted against recommending a change from 
the plurality default for three reasons:  it virtually assures a successful 
election of directors in every election, voting results are delivered in a 
simple and transparent way, and it is a standard that fits well with the 
many varying shareholder rights schemes (e.g., cumulative votes, 
multiple share classes).46 
However, it recommended a change to the MBCA47 that 
substantially mirrors the Delaware majority voting amendments 
(including facilitating a director resignation policy) with the following 
caveat:  operation of the holdover rule default48 could be stayed to 
require a director failing to receive a majority vote in favor of their 
election, in a company that adopted majority voting in its bylaws, to 
step down within 90 days of the election.49 The Committee reasoned 
that, absent an alteration to the holdover rule, the consequences of a 
majority voting bylaw would remain largely symbolic.50 So its 
recommendation would amend the MBCA to expressly permit a bylaw 
to opt out of the holdover default in the sole circumstance of a director 
 
45 McBride, PLI report at 298. 
46 Preliminary report at 20. 
47 As there is some overlap between the membership of the ABA Committee and the 
Delaware Council on Corporate law, and both are composed in part by practicing 
members of the Delaware Bar, the deliberations by each group are appropriately cross-
referenced.  See American Bar Association, "Preliminary Report of the Committee on 
Corporate Laws on Voting by Shareholders for the Election of Directors" at 7 (Jan. 17, 
2006), available at 
www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL270000pub/directorvoting/20060117000001.pd
.7[hereinafter “Preliminary Report”] (“Delaware is not a Model Act State, but Delaware 
lawmakers carefully study the work of Committee and Model Act Developments”). 
48 The holdover rule, allowing for a director failing to win an election to stay on until a 
replacement is elected and qualified, serves the purpose of ensuring that “the power of 
the Board of Directors to act continues uninterrupted even though an annual 
shareholder’s meeting is not held or the shareholders are deadlocked and unable to elect 
directors at the meeting.” See MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN., §8.05 at 8-47 (Official 
Comment). 
49 See Preliminary Report, supra, at 4 
50 See Id. at 16. 
12 Pandora’s Ballot Box, or a Proxy with Moxie? 
elected by plurality vote but failing to achieve a majority of votes cast.  
The recommendations specifically exempt private, non-traded 
corporations and corporations that allow cumulative voting, since the 
justification of empowering shareholders is not as availing in those 
cases.51
2) California’s approach 
 
California, in considering amendments concerning majority 
voting, had to also take into account the effect of majority voting on 
cumulative voting, as California mandates cumulative voting for firms 
incorporated in California (but then provides an exemption to all firms 
listed on a national exchange).52 The effect of majority voting on 
cumulative voting is subject to some debate.  In California, no director 
may be removed by a majority of shareholders whose votes would be 
sufficient to win under cumulative voting.53 Otherwise, a majority vote 
may eliminate a director who would otherwise be victorious under a 
cumulative voting regime.  So, if one must choose between the two 
methods, the choice would depend on whether the relevant value 
judgment presented is empowering all shareholders vs. the board or 
empowering large shareholders vs. small shareholders.  Adopting 
cumulative voting for contested elections, but allowing a majority 
withhold vote provision for uncontested elections may resolve the 
disparity.54 
A bill seeking to amend the California Corporation Code 
currently awaiting the Governor’s signature, much like the MBCA, 
exempts corporations with cumulative voting (and also, by implication, 
corporations not listed on a national exchange).55 It only permits 
shareholders to opt out of plurality voting for uncontested elections, 
reaching the same result as the MBCA but by different means.56 It 
originally disallowed board discretion in carrying out a director 
resignation policy, but has since been amended to grant the board of 
directors of corporations the authority to reappoint a rejected director if 
special circumstances, as determined by the board, warrant the 
retention of the director.57 In addition, the bill provides that the vote to 
 
51 See Id. at 13. 
52 1 Cal. Corp. Code § 301.5(a). 
53 1 Cal. Corp. Code § 303. 
54 See an exchange between Broc Romanek and a Calpers representative, posted on 
www.thecorporatecounsel.net/blog/archive/2006_08.html.    
55 See California Senate Bill 1207, available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/. 
56 Id. 
57 Id.
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change the corporate bylaws to majority vote requirements for director 
elections must be by vote of all outstanding shares rather than by a 
majority of votes cast, a more onerous requirement than the MBCA or 
Delaware’s default rule.58 
3) The Grundfest proposal 
 
Professor Grundfest has proposed tailoring SEC regulations and 
listing standards to take into account a successful majority withhold 
vote against a director.59 This would have the benefit of not requiring 
abolition of the holdover rule to give effect to a successful campaign 
against a recalcitrant board.  Among many alternative strategies for his 
proposal, Grundfest notes that SRO listing standards could be amended 
to exclude from the definition of independent director one from whom a 
majority of votes have been withheld60, or they could have their vote 
unrecognized for purposes of any listing standard voting requirement.61 
Furthermore, the SEC could enhance their disclosure liability, commit to 
challenging indemnification of such directors, or enhance regulatory 
scrutiny of filings by companies with a majority withheld director.62 For 
that matter, the Chancery Court could also alter its review of decisions 
by directors in which a majority withhold vote has been successful.63 
Grundfest would temper his approach with a 90 day delay of the 
effective date and a cure mechanism using shareholder consents to 
allow the board an opportunity to respond to a successful withhold 
campaign without penalty.64 This approach would enhance the 
negotiating leverage for financial intermediaries that are able to institute 
 
58 Id.
59 Grundfest, Joseph A., Advice and Consent: An alternative Mechanism for 
Shareholder Participation in the Nomination and Election of Corporate Directors. In 
Lucian Bebchuk, ed., Shareholder Access to the Corporate Ballot (Harvard University 
Press, 2004).  
60 Id. at 10. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 12.   For instance, decisions of special litigation committees are afforded 
discretion under business judgment review.  Upon proper pleading, they can be 
examined under “entire fairness review”.  See  Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (1984). 
64 Id. Grundfest also notes that allowing cures by shareholder consent could allow the 
regulatory body to designate replacements as tainted by the withhold vote as well, thus 
keeping the board from using its power to replace to minimize the effect of Grundfest’s 
proposal.   
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successful campaigns, without entirely halting a board’s ability to 
function.65 
4) An International Perspective 
 
For European Companies, majority voting is the default method for 
electing directors in both contested and uncontested elections, with 
some rare exceptions.66 Japan uses a supermajority voting requirement 
to oust directors.67 Proponents of majority voting use examples from 
corporate elections in Europe and Japan to counter arguments that the 
collateral damages of majority voting makes it inherently too risky 
(failed elections, etc.).68 Critics might counter that the numerous other 
governance differences between the United States and Europe/Japan 
strain a meaningful comparison.69
III. The Shareholder Power Debate, A Foucault Pendulum 
 
A. The General Debate 
 
Berle and Means were the first noble souls to develop the story 
of corporate development in the 19th century.70 They argued that the 
development of capital intensive operations of the industrial revolution 
 
65 ISS Report, supra, at 10. 
66 Around the World in Sixty Minutes, An overview of international Corporate 
Governance Trends, Institutional Investor Services, October 21, 2005, page 5.  
Available at 
http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/GlobalCorporateGovernancePerspectivesSD.pdf. 
67 Id. at 16. 
68 ISS Report, supra, at 13. 
69 For more information on those differences, See generally Klaus J. Hopt, Labor 
Representation on Corporate Boards: Impacts and Problems for Corporate Governance 
and Economic Integration in Europe, 14 INT’L L REV. L.& ECON. 203 (1994). 
70 See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) AT 6. The Berle Means theory of corporate history is 
far from universally accepted.  For instance, Werner argues that the ownership/control 
dichotomy preceded the industrial revolution.  Walter Werner, Corporation Law in 
Search of its Future, 81 COLUM L. REV. 1611, 1612 (1981).  Mark Roe also presents a 
more nuanced explanation of how market segmentation resulted from interested groups 
exercising political influence in favor of financial disintermediation.  See Mark J. Roe, 
Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance 
44 (1994). However, we will stick with Berle and Means for the time being as a useful 
model.  In much the way that Einsteinian relativity and quantum physics did not replace 
Newtonian mechanics so much as show circumstances in which it was unable to 
describe the world, leaving Newtonian mechanics to still describe most conventional 
physical phenemona, the Berle Means theory of corporate history is still a useful 
explanation despite the various alternate versions of economic history that it inspired. 
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required larger capital inflows than any individual could provide.  That, 
combined with an interest in diversification, resulted in a fragmentation 
of share ownership and a resulting divergence between ownership and 
control in the modern corporate organism. 
 
Fama & Jensen’s model of agency conflict informs a discussion 
of the relationship between a board of directors and its shareholders in 
describing how the separation of ownership from control can 
complicate matters in the modern Berle-Means corporation.71 Jensen 
described that relationship as one in which principals engage agents to 
perform a service which entails delegation of authority.  If both parties 
to the relationship are utility-maximizers, many situations may arise in 
which the agents interest will diverge from that of the principal.  
Principals would then expend to create incentives for agents to limit 
aberrant activities, and agents would frequently expend bonding costs 
to ensure principal interest and maintain a profitable relationship.  But if 
agents can take advantage of information asymmetries to engage in 
profitable aberration at the principals’ expense and without the 
principals’ knowledge, it may be rational for them to do so.72 
In steps corporate law fiduciary duties to relieve the conflict, but 
corporate law is fairly deferential to board decisions. The shareholder 
franchise serves as the justification for this deference of authority given 
to the board of directors in the form of the business judgment rule and 
the demand requirement for derivative litigation.73 In essence, the 
argument goes, “you elected them, now let them do their jobs, and if 
you don’t like it, replace them.”74 The threat of being able to replace 
directors should mean that shareholders will be in a better position to 
negotiate for change, and directors will have added incentive to avoid 
 
71 Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. 
& ECON. 301 (1983). 
72 Berle and Means, supra, at 6. 
73 A key element of the corporate structure is the shareholder franchise-- shareholders' 
power to elect and replace directors. Corporate statutes provide shareholders with this 
power, which courts view as a fundamental element of the corporate structure. Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk,  The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 
851 (January 2005), citing Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 
1988) (noting the "central importance of the franchise to the scheme of corporate 
governance"); See also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A3d 946 (Del. 1985). 
74 Some argue that shareholder supremacy fails to take into account stakeholders, such 
as employees or creditors, who deserve a say in corporate decision-making.  The U.S. 
model provides for shareholder supremacy, as shareholders are the only group with a 
fixed and permanent interest in the underlying assets of the corporation.  Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 66-72 
(1991). I will leave the shareholder v. stakeholder debate to other fora for now and 
focus on the shareholder v. manager conflict, with the debatable assumption that the 
U.S. shareholder supremacy model is superior. 
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results that will induce shareholders to initiate a campaign to replace 
them.75 
The field of corporate law is awash in battles over whether or not 
shareholder control is largely a myth perpetrated by those who stand to 
benefit by board entrenchment.76 Recent evidence compiled by 
Professor Bebchuk indicates that the balance of power in corporate 
elections has, over the last 10 years, run markedly in favor of boards.77
But corporate law traditionalists argue that the case for increasing 
shareholder power is inherently flawed.78 They urge that the internal 
inconsistency of shareholder’s commitment to a company and the 
inconsistent goals of different shareholders make it extremely difficult 
for corporate law to make shareholders absolutely prime, even if that is 
the outcome favored.79 The question arises:  which type of shareholder 
matters more?80 The day trader, or the pensioner; the institutional 
investor, or the small investor?81 The time horizon and the character of 
the investor determine the ability of corporate lawmakers and 
chancellors to encourage the shareholder primacy model.82 The 
different interests of shareholders makes it difficult for corporate 
policymakers to engineer legal regimes in such a way as to determine 
which type of shareholder the board member should serve.  This 
describes the difficulty in determining whether shareholder primacy 
goals are attainable without even going into the non-financial goals that 
 
75 Also observed in Stephen Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting 
Rights 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, at 614 (February 2006). 
76 Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law 95 (1986) (noting cynic’s view that “the whole 
institution of shareholder voting is a fraud”); See also Stout, Lynn The Mythical 
benefits of Shareholder Control working paper; See also Stephen Bainbridge, Director 
Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, *1736 (2006); 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784 
(April 2006). 
77 Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV.
833 (January 2005). 
78 “Far from the single owner of a building, the shareholders are a diverse and ever-
shifting group of people and institutions, with differing interests and, in the case of 
institutional investors, differing obligations to their own diverse constituencies.”  
Martin Lipton and Steven Rosenblum, Election Contests on the Corporate proxy, An 
Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67, *68, (November 2003).  A logical 
observation; but also a consistent one, coming from the inventor of the poison pill. 
79 “Shareholders with private interests, however, might prefer the firm to pursue those 
interests at the expense of the interests they have in common with other shareholders.”, 
Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 561, *575 (February 2006). 
80 Id.. 
81 Also observed by Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Voting Rights, supra, at 634. 
82 Lipton, supra,at 74 
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shareholders may have.  Corporate Pensions investing in the companies 
that employ their membership are one example.  Those shareholders 
potentially have an interest in full employment that could conflict with 
the wealth maximization goals of other shareholders.83 Socially 
responsible investors who seek policy changes like divestment present 
another interesting problem.84 
The corporate law traditionalists85 urge that a corporation is 
merely a “nexus of contracts”86, and shareholders deserve no more than 
the benefit of the contracts they are able to negotiate.87 If one should 
leave it up to shareholders to express dissatisfaction with their share 
performance by taking the “Wall Street Walk,”88 access to capital 
markets may be sufficient to discipline managerial shirking or self-
dealing.  If one assumes semi-strong market efficiency, shareholders 
should be looking out for their own interests already without the need 
for corporate law by simply determining who they invest in.89 
Reputation costs in the capital market should be the controlling force 
that keeps management focused on the interests of shareholders.  
Another interesting dimension to the shareholder democracy debate is 
whether one share, one vote is the even the right allocation of voting 
rights.90 For instance, warrant and option holders, who have an 
 
83 Bainbridge, supra, at 609, citing Morris M. Kleiner & Marvin L. Bouillon, Providing 
Business Information to Production Workers: Correlates of Compensation and 
Profitability, 41 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 605, 614-15 (1988) 
84 Continuing that line of analysis, one might ask what about shareholders that have 
moderate risk preferences, versus high risk preferences?  Also, conflicts may directly 
arise between shareholders that implicate anti-competitive practices.  Would a large 
hedge fund that owns an interest in each of two competing companies make voting 
decisions that would work to erode value for other shareholders?   
85 For an effective summary of the traditionalist view, see Leo Strine, Toward a True 
Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving 
Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, *1762 (April 2006). 
86 Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
87 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1416 (1989); But compare Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, 
and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985) 
88 Selling your shares, also known as the “Wall Street Rule”, explored in further detail 
in Bainbridge, supra, at 619. 
89 There is a substantial literature regarding bounded rationality, beyond the scope of 
this article, which calls into question the rational choices of economic actors.  See 
generally John Conlisk Why Bounded Rationality? 34 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC 
LITERATURE 669 (June 1996). 
90 See generally Shaun Martin and Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, U. ILL. L. REV., 
(2005). 
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expected interest somewhat similar to plain vanilla shareholders, get no 
voting rights.91 
The pro-management side of the argument continues that 
corporate law will not be nearly as effective at setting up a shareholder 
primacy regime, in that it’s efficiency would lag behind that of an 
information market such as the securities market.92 Some argue that 
what it can provide is a regime that mandates accurate disclosure to 
make this market more efficient, as the securities laws do, but it cannot 
be an effective instrument to force companies to put shareholders first.93 
Traditionalists also cite what is essentially an “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix 
it” argument that the U.S. financial markets perform well in comparison 
to other countries, so corporate governance and board primacy cannot 
be all that bad.94 It’s a simple and effective system, according to its 
adherents.  But not everyone agrees that the Wall Street Rule is a 
congent justification for a lack of real shareholder democracy.  For one, 
large investor’s need to diversify means they can’t sell off their whole 
portfolio.  Further, too much buying and selling leads to tax and fee 
consequences that will diminish returns for investors.  What is more, 
institutions selling out to express dissatisfaction will itself diminish the 
share value for other investors, leading to a sort of downward spiral 
effect.95 And while they can diversify against individual corporate 
operational risk, finding a way to minimize operational risk (from 
shirking and self-dealing) systematically might well be worth the cost of 
changing the balance of power, according to advocates of the 
shareholder democracy movement.  Shareholder rights advocates urge 
that it’s worth giving it a shot, as we have never have given institutions 
a chance to oversee management.  How do we know if a refined 
shareholder franchise doesn’t earn a premium through encouraging 
more effective governance if we never try? 
 
91 Id. This analysis can get quite complicated.  For instance, a shareholder who also 
sells shares short is betting against the enterprise but still gets to vote in elections 
controlling its future. 
92 Bainbridge, supra, at 627. 
93 They effectively argue that all we can do is require disclosure of financial data and 
other information, leave ultimate power and discretion in the hands of managers, and 
allow the capital markets to reward managers if shareholders like what the managers 
are doing. 
94 Stephen Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1735, *1739 (April 2006)(“Despite the alleged flaws in its governance 
system, the U.S. economy has performed very well, both on an absolute basis and 
particularly relative to other countries.”).  This argument, however, is the least 
convincing proposed by traditionalist apologists.  The question remains:  Under an 
optimal governance regime, how much better would our markets perform? 
95 Furthermore, index investors, an increasingly popular asset class, are stuck as they do 
not sell shares based on idiosyncratic characteristics of the stock. 
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Bebchuk offers evidence that management typically ignores 
precatory proposals to eliminate staggered boards.96 Bebchuk, Coates, 
and Subramanian aptly note that staggered boards serve as an effective 
sandbar against any wave of shareholder reform.97 Critics would use 
this as evidence that changing election defaults is a useless endeavor. It 
is nevertheless uncertain whether this is an indictment of the argument 
of board accountability, or merely a reflection of a lack of board 
accountability.98 At present, about half of companies have staggered 
boards, so perhaps reform activity can be effective at those companies 
notwithstanding.  Bebchuk argues that shareholders should be able to 
decide the balance of power they favor.99 In effect, he would let the 
shareholder decide, through adopting bylaws that control the balance of 
power, where their preference sits in the shareholder power debate.  It’s 
an effective resolution, as most of the arguments in favor of 
management discretion rest on assumptions about preferences for 
capital owners, efficiencies that work to the benefit of capital owners, 
and freedom of contract.  Perhaps the power to adopt bylaws that 
change Bebchuk’s rules of the game100 is a way of minimizing the 
adhesive contract that purchasing a share is currently and would, 
effectively, make the contract bargaining process more balanced.101 
Now we’ve come around full circle to see that the majority 
voting amendment comports with Bebchuk’s challenge to resolve the 
debate by allowing shareholders to initiate rules of the game changes 
into the corporate bylaws.  The majority voting provision initiated by 
Delaware will not end the tug of war between management and 
 
96 “The evidence put forward below shows that management often elects not to initiate 
rules-of-the-game decisions for which shareholders register strong support in precatory 
resolutions.”  Bebchuk, supra,  at 852.   
97See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The 
Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 
STAN. L. REV. 887, 925-39 (2002).  Indeed, companies failing to accommodate the 
precatory proposals, as members of staggered boards, would be difficult to replace in 
response to their refusal to eliminate the staggered board under the precatory proposal. 
98 In other words, do shareholders fail to hold directors to the carpet because they are 
disinterested due to cost inefficiencies, or because they are unable due to staggered 
directorships? 
99 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 Harv. 
L. Rev. 833 (January 2005). 
100 Id. at 844 
101 It might be that some firms would see shareholder adoption of pro-management 
bylaws, others wouldn’t.  Policy makers would also be able to then regress the 
performance of the different allocations of authority, something we haven’t previously 
been able to study.  Perhaps the difference in whether such a bylaw passes would 
depend in part on earning performance preceding the election, and would only target 
perennial under-performers. 
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shareholders that has picked up speed over the last 30 years.  This 
debate is bound to continue well into the 21st century.  But the effect of 
this majority voting accommodation will interact with other elements of 
corporate governance policy in as yet unforeseen ways, and will likely 
have a more powerful effect on the balance of power between boards 
and shareholders than is presently understood.  On the other hand, the 
effectiveness of majority voting will depend, as we shall see, on the 
ability of firms to outflank majority voting amendments with various 
evasive tactics still available.  But before exploring that further, we 
should get a firmer grasp of the present economic incentives facing the 
shareholders who would make use of the power of majority voting. 
 
B. Institutional Investors and the Collective Action Problem; Why no one 
volunteers for Kitchen Patrol in Mutual Fund Families. 
 
Institutional Investors own a significant percentage of equity 
outstanding in U.S. markets.102 However, their ability to influence 
corporate decision making is minimized by the effect of securities 
laws,103 conflicts of interest,104 and economic cost phenemona.105
Activism was also classically constrained by the free rider problem.106 
Historically, institutional investors used their power in two ways: 
“jawboning” management in negotiations and presenting a shareholder 
governance proposal at an annual meeting.107 Institutions would 
typically target a small number of underperforming firms to make 
 
102 See, e.g., Robert C. Pozen, Institutional Perspective on Shareholder Nominations of 
Corporate Directors, 59 BUS. LAW 95, 95 n.2 (2003) (institutional investors held 55.8% 
of publicly traded equities in the United States in 2001). 
103 See Bainbridge Limited Voting, supra, at 618. 
104 (“Those institutions most inclined to be activist investors are associated with state 
governments and labor unions, and often appear to be driven by concerns other than a 
desire to increase the economic performance of the companies in which they invest. By 
contrast, those institutional investors one might think are best situated to make wise 
voting decisions--the money managers who operate mutual funds, particularly index 
funds--have little desire to spend money on stockholder activism or offend corporate 
management.”)  See Strine, supra, at *1765; See also Brickley, J.A., Lease, R.C. and 
Smith, C.W., 1988, Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments,
Journal of Financial Economics 20: 267-292. 
105 Coffee, J.C., Jr., Liquidity versus control: The institutional investor as corporate 
monitor. Columbia Law Review 91: 1277-1368; See also footnote from Grundfest, Just 
Vote No, supra.
106 Even the most activist institutions spend less than less than half a basis point of 
assets under management (.005%) per year on their governance efforts (Del Guercio 
and Hawkins 1997).  Black, infra, at 5.   
107 Black, Bernard.  Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United 
States; published in Peter Newman, ed., The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 
and the Law (1998), page 2. 
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examples of them.108 Merely voting no is certainly less costly than 
submitting an alternate slate of directors.  Withold vote campaigns were 
more of a remote-control sort of activism. 
Numerous academics (notably: Grundfest, Rock, and Black, among 
others) have modeled investor rationality using Equation (A) to describe 
where it becomes economically rational for an investor to undertake 
action109 using variants of the following equation:  
 
(A) ci < pi * xi * Bi
where, 
ci = shareholder i's expected cost of participation; 
pi = shareholder i's estimate of the probability that her decision to 
participate will result in successful collective action with benefits Bi ;
xi = the percentage of the corporation's shares owned by shareholder 
i; and 
Bi = shareholder i's estimate of the aggregate net benefits to all 
shareholders that will result from successful collective action. 
 
This equation states that a profit-maximizing shareholder will agree 
to bear the private costs of participation, ci, only when those costs are 
less than the anticipated benefits to that individual shareholder, xiBi,
weighted by the estimated probability, pi, that the shareholder's 
participation in the initiative will contribute to generating those 
benefits.110 
This simple equation described why mutual funds and other 
institutional investors weren’t more active in calling for change.  
Institutional activism is picking up speed, however, in both majority 
voting and calls for a shareholder nomination capability.  Granted, 
withhold votes are still an inexpensive means to call for change as 
 
108 Black, Bernard supra “For example, CalPERS, the largest state pension plan and the 
Council iof Institutional Investors annually identify a handful of poorly performing 
firms as targets for governance initiatives. This lets a proposal serves double duty: as a 
way to improve governance procedures and as a signal of investor displeasure with 
management.” 
109 This equation and its explanation in the paragraph that follows it is drawn from 
Grundfest, Joseph,  Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians 
Inside the Gates 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, *910 (1993); citing Bernard S. Black, 
Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, at 575-91 (1989); Edward 
B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism,
79 GEO. L.J. 445, 453-63 (1991). 
110 Id, Grundfest further explains: “This last variable, pi, incorporates (1) each 
shareholder's ex ante estimate that the process as a whole will overcome the collective 
action problems described above, as well as (2) the shareholder's subjective assessment 
of the extent to which her participation in the process contributes to reaching the final 
outcome.”   
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before, it’s just that the law is changing to give this inexpensive form of 
activism legal consequence.  But, assuming the rationality model is still 
valid, there may be more that we can add to the rationality equation.  At 
present, I would posit that a handful of phenomena uniquely alter the 
calculus of investor rationality and explain part of the reason for this 
change from the status quo.   
 
First, the expected rapid decrease in the cost of proxy solicitation111
due to the SEC’s move for online proxy availability makes the variable ci
significantly lower than before.  The elimination of broker voting112 will 
also make shareholder initiatives more likely to succeed by decreasing 
the number of votes necessary to achieve success, thus increasing the 
variable pi. Additionally, the development of information 
intermediaries, such as ISS and Glass Lewis, Inc., that specialize in 
compiling data and quantifying and rating the corporate governance 
function of companies, and then use that information to advise 
institutions how to vote their proxy, dramatically decrease the cost of 
collaboration in a proxy campaign and also work to increase the odds of 
its success.113 
Additionally, we must add activist hedge funds into the calculus.114 
Hedge funds run over 1.5 trillion dollars, and investors in hedge funds 
count on their managers for active management to increase alpha 
(returns).  Hedge funds earn a percentage of their fund returns and a 
management fee based on the size of funds under management.  One 
strategy that hedge funds use to achieve returns is instituting 
shareholder activist activity.  After taking a significant position in an 
underperforming company, it may agitate for corporate policy changes 
through threatening to lead a proxy fight or threatening litigation by 
using rights afforded shareholders.115 Recognizing legal consequence 
for withhold vote campaigns adds another tool to their arsenal. Whether 
this works to the benefit of other shareholders is legitimately debated.116 
111 See Section infra on online proxy solicitation. 
112 See Section infra on the NYSE’s amendment to Rule 452. 
113 See Strine, supra, at 1765 “For that reason, many rely heavily on the advice of yet 
another level of agency, firms like Institutional Investor Services (ISS) that provide 
advice on how to vote on corporate ballot issues, to satisfy their legal obligation to vote 
in an informed manner on behalf of their investors.”  
114 Bainbridge also observes that hedge funds are a new exception to the rarity of 
institutionally funded proxy fights.  See Bainbridge, supra, at 630. 
115 E.g., 220 actions, shareholder derivative suits, appraisal rights, seek injunctions of 
corporate merger activity, etc.  The potential for such annoyance could make it 
economically rational for the board to pay the fund to go away by, say, buying back the 
fund’s shares at a premium. 
116 For an exploration of some of the disturbing implications of empty voting, where 
hedge funds purchasing the right to vote other owners shares may result in an incentive 
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Some say they are reminiscent of the greenmailers of the 80s, while 
others argue that they can effectively overcome the shareholder 
collective action problem and inure benefits for their fellow 
shareholders.117 
A rational activist fund would include the expected returns of future 
inflows of investment that might result from a successful campaign to 
alter management policies through a withhold vote or proxy fight.  
Proxy fights are always heavily covered in the business press, and 
raising funds from even sophisticated investors is inherently a sales 
game.  So a sensible fund would include the value of that good P.R. in 
its calculus.  We might model it this way: 
 
(B) ci < pi * xi * Bi + pii * Rii
Where 
 
pii = The expected probability of the proxy campaign’s overall 
success. 
 
Rii = The expected present value of future benefits to activist hedge 
fund ii in the form of management fees and performance fees earned 
in the future on an influx of future capital due to the favorable 
signals to hedge fund investors that the fund initiating the campaign 
has a distinct advantage in increasing returns through activism. 
 
to vote in a way that actually harms the firm, see Henry T.C. Hu and Bernard Black, 
Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and 
Reforms, 61 BUS. LAW. 1011, (May 2006).  Hedge fund participation in withhold vote 
campaigns using borrowed shares could mean that this shareholder democracy 
movement could be hijacked by market players with perverse incentives, as in the case 
of a fund with a leveraged short position in a firm that bought voting rights in that firm.  
Whether hedge fund participation in the shareholder democracy movement will 
collaborative or parasitic remains to be seen.  This concern was also recently relayed by 
SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins in a speech before the 2007 Corporate Directors’ 
Forum.  Available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch012207psa.htm#10. 
117 See the share buyback programs initiated at Imclone and AOL Time Warner as a 
result of Carl Icahn’s activism at those firms.  In a share buyback, a company will buy 
shares and convert them to treasury holdings, which has the effect of increasing the per 
share price of all shares outstanding as the total market value is divided over a lower 
number of shares.  This method may be preferred over a simple dividend due to income 
tax efficiency.  Whether this works to the benefit of other shareholders would depend 
on whether the time horizon of the fund, typically very short, meches well with the 
other shareholders.  For instance, some shareholders may prefer that more money be 
invested in research and development for future appreciation in share value because the 
firm has a distinct advantage in some area over the long term.  Other shareholders may 
want appreciation immediately. 
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Ri might look something like the standard equation for 
discounting future cash flows: 
 
Ri = Qt=0   FVt / (1+d)t
Or, put more simply, the sum of future cash flows over the 
applicable period.  Those cash flows would come as a percentage of the 
influx of future capital in the form of a management fee and would 
include a percentage of the performance fee on the amount by which the 
fund presumed it could make the capital influx grow. 
 
Activist hedge funds would use Equation (B) in ascertaining 
whether or not a proxy fight was worth their while.  Additionally, 
though it would be difficult to quantify, we might analogize that union 
and private pension fund investors may also obtain some private 
benefit, either for political advantage for the appointed board or future 
membership drives in a union, that would make activism more 
profitable for them than it would be for, say, a mutual fund whose 
investors are more passive.118 Making hedge fund especially relevant to 
this discussion is the fact that the institutions that traditionally served as 
active intermediaries, such as Calpers, are increasingly investing in 
activist hedge funds.119 
IV. The Shareholder Power Debate as Applied to Majority Voting 
 
A. General Arguments 
 
In the context of withhold votes, some argue this will decrease 
incentives for eligible directors to want to serve, would turn usually 
collegial board activity divisive, or would distract board members from 
more productive activity.120 Of course, every change in corporate 
governance that works against the discretion and the financial security 
of management is hailed as yet another factor diminishing the pool of 
talent willing to serve on boards of directors.  The response would be 
that either you’re dealing with prestige seekers, who we’re not worried 
about anyway because how could that conflict with the interest of the 
company; Or, we’re dealing with people who want money, in which 
 
118 Romano explores institutional shareholder conflicts of interest in more detail.  See 
Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable 
Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE. J. ON REG. 174, 177 (2001). 
119 E.g., One of activist hedge fund Shamrock Holdings’ largest investors is Calpers. 
120 See Strine, supra, at 1768 “Due to her knowledge of how corporate boards work, the 
traditionalist has little interest in initiatives that single out specific board members for 
defeat or embarrassment. She knows boards almost always work by consensus and it is 
therefore silly to hold a solitary director responsible for a company's poor performance 
or lack of responsiveness to shareholder interests”. 
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case just increase board compensation.  This is not nearly as convincing 
an argument in this context as it is in discussing increases in director 
liability.  The embarrassment of a withhold vote pales in comparison to 
the obligations directors face in the wake of Disney121 and Sarbanes-
Oxley.  The marginal disincentive against serving on boards presented 
by the prospect of a withhold vote campaign would be minimal. 
 
The argument has also been raised that giving the power to 
eliminate directors through a withhold vote campaign would make 
directors prey to the self interested desires of groups, like labor unions 
and public pensions, whose interests may run counter to the larger 
group of shareholders.122 Directors would be risk-adverse, the 
argument runs, and would fold in negotiations with these groups in the 
event a withhold vote was threatened.123 However, this presumes that 
the threat was credible.  Would a Board give credence to the threat of a 
union shareholder to institute a withhold vote campaign if the Board 
didn’t enhance its retention policies?  Fidelity and Calpers would prove 
more difficult to convince in such a campaign than the buildup to 
shareholder dissatisfaction with Michael Eisner.  Thus when 
shareholders have reasons that don’t comport with benefits to share 
value, the other sophisticated shareholder would presumably side with 
management in the campaign.  The only exception may be that unions 
and public pensions might use their clout for private benefit in 
companies where a withhold vote would be salient for other reasons.124 
Yet another argument against giving legal effect to withhold 
votes is that it would actually have the unintended effect of making 
them less likely.  The same group that originally argued against 
withhold votes as damaging director reputations now asserts that 
symbolic withhold votes are a positive force in governance, but only 
when they remain symbolic.  Institutions may be less likely to institute 
them if it has powerful and concrete effects on the firm in which they 
are invested.  This is clearly a complicated quantitative question, one we 
will probably not know that answer to until more time has passed.  
Interestingly, ISS doesn’t see this as an issue.125 
B. A First Strike Capability for financial intermediaries 
121 In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. Sup. 2006). 
122 See Saunders, Robert.  “Why Majority Voting in Director Elections is a Bad Idea,” 
1 Virginia Law & Business Review 107 (2006). 
123 Id. at 122. 
124 For example, if an employee’s union had agreed not the go along with the withhold 
vote against Eisner, in exchange for concessions on employee bargaining, but such 
collusion would be possible without the specter of a voting challenge. 
125 ISS Report, supra, at 16. 
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Critics assert that, should a withhold vote be successful against a 
number of directors, then the ability of the board to function could be 
constrained.126 Institutional shareholder claim that, far from killing the 
golden goose, they only want an opportunity to single out individual 
directors and hope to negotiate in advance of the specter of a withhold 
vote campaign.127 But, even if the holdover rule were abolished and 
withhold vote wars could create such chaos, would the ability to 
threaten such an outcome be without precedent?  And if such 
brinkmanship is a legitimate tool of corporate power negotiations, why 
not give some such power to institutional investors?  If a withhold vote 
could eliminate the independent members of a board, thus making the 
board non-compliant with independence rules and unable to create 
independent committees, then institutional investors would be vested 
with the same form of scorched-earth tactic that case law has blessed in 
the poison pill.128 Though there would be no fiduciary check on such a 
power, we might expect some form of détente in this nuclear arms race.  
 
126For instance, it may be unable to achieve a quorum to conduct business; it could 
constitute a breach of an executive candidate’s employment agreement resulting in a 
trigger of severance payments; it could result in a "change of control” under corporate 
credit agreements resulting in accelerating debt or canceling a line of credit, or 
triggering changes in licenses, franchise agreements or other important corporate 
arrangements, or if  a fixed number of directors is to be elected by holders of one class 
of securities, a failure to elect one or more directors could alter the relationship among 
shareholders of different classes, or the company’s ability to comply with stock 
exchange listing standards or other requirements for maintaining independent directors 
or directors with particular qualifications may be inhibited, or the failure to elect one or 
more candidates may alter the consequences of having a staggered or classified board, 
and finally a dissident group with minority representation on the board of directors 
could enlarge its percentage of directors if new nominees to the board are not elected -- 
thereby avoiding the need for a direct proxy contest challenge and altering the existing 
dynamics of control contests. COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS DISCUSSION 
PAPER  1506 PLI/Corp 473, *481 
127 The President of the United Airlines Pilots Union claimed “We don’t want to kill the 
golden goose, just choke it by the neck until it give us every last egg”  Roger 
Lowenstein, “Into Thin Air”, New York Times, Feb. 17, 2002, § 6 at 40. 
128 Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1353 (Del. 1985) (“Having 
concluded that sufficient authority for the Rights Plan exists in 8 Del.C. § 157, we note 
the inherent powers of the Board conferred by 8 Del.C. § 141(a), n11 concerning the 
management of the corporation's "business and affairs" also provides the Board 
additional authority upon which to enact the Rights Plan.”); Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum 
Corp., 493 A.2d 946, 953-954 (Del. 1985)(“The board has a large reservoir of authority 
upon which to draw.  Its duties and responsibilities proceed from the inherent powers 
conferred by 8 Del.C. § 141(a), respecting management of the corporation's "business 
and affairs". n6 Additionally, the powers here being exercised derive from 8 Del.C. § 
160(a), conferring broad authority upon a corporation to deal in its own stock. From 
this it is now well established that in the acquisition of its shares a Delaware 
corporation may deal selectively with its stockholders, provided the directors have not 
acted out of a sole or primary purpose to entrench themselves in office.”) ; Maldonado 
v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1255 (Del. Ch. 1980) rev’d on other grounds.
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After all, the threat would only be salient in the event that it appeared 
likely a majority of shareholders voting in the election would go along, 
and turnout would seemingly be higher if the prospect of such 
consequences were present.  The traditionalist’s ready response would 
be that the scorched earth tactic embodied in the poison pill is permitted 
only for a discrete case, the change of control transaction, which is 
especially subject to a risk of erosion of shareholder value.  Thus, it 
hardly justifies expansion of that form of power into the hands of 
institutional and activist investors for general use.  This diversion is 
entirely academic at this point, as the holdover rule would function (as a 
sort of missile defense) to ultimately protect against nearly all of the 
enumerated fallout.  However, in the event that alterations to the 
holdover rule enter the agenda this analysis should be revisited. 
 
Critics of institutional investor activism generally also cite concerns 
over the growth of influence wielded by ISS and other proxy solicitation 
firms.129 Corporate law traditionalists also posit that institutions and 
proxy advisory services are not constrained by the strictures of fiduciary 
duty jurisprudence and are more short term oriented than corporate 
managers, thus they can’t be trusted to wield corporate power as 
responsibly.130 One response might be that alternative directors put 
forth by the institutions in proxy fights would also be held to the same 
responsibilities, or that such analysis flips fiduciary duty on its 
side…shareholders were never meant to bear fiduciary burdens, and 
can be trusted to make decisions about bylaws and elections outside of 
the change-of-control context that serve the interests of all shareholders.  
We need not resolve the debate here, however.  My objective is merely 
to set the stage for withhold votes to enter the fray.  But first, we should 
examine some initiatives that other regulatory agencies have been 
exploring in 2006 that will have a profound effect on majority voting. 
 
V. Brewing a Perfect Storm---SEC proxy reform, NYSE Exchange Rule 
452, and Internet Proxy Solicitation. 
 
A. A Modest Proposal 
 
In 2003, The Securities Exchange Commission considered a rule to 
allow shareholders to include nominees on the corporate ballot upon 
 
129 See Strine, supra, at 1765. 
130 Strine, supra, at  “Unlike corporate managers, neither institutional investors as 
stockholders nor ISS as a voting advisor owe fiduciary duties to the corporations whose 
policies they seek to influence. And unlike the individual investors whose capital they 
use to wield influence, institutional investors and their advisors bear far less of the 
residual risk of poor voting decisions, as their compensation turns more on short-term 
factors than on long-run growth.”   
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the occurrence of certain triggering events.131 This is extremely 
important, as companies typically vote on behalf of shareholders who 
are unable to attend the annual meeting, and solicit the proxies of those 
shareholders in order to do so.  A proxy statement must be delivered to 
shareholders in connection with that solicitation which will describe the 
issues and proposals up for vote.132 As a company uses its resources to 
pay the cost of these proxy solicitations, which can be prohibitive, 
getting one’s proposal onto the corporate proxy is vital.133 However, a 
company may exclude a shareholder proposal if it relates to an election 
or falls under other criterion enumerated by the SEC.134 Recently, the 
SEC has initiated a process to revisit its interpretation of the election 
exclusion in response to AFSCME v. AIG, in which the Second Circuit 
held that a shareholder bylaw proposing a method for including 
shareholder nominees on the corporate ballot in future elections did not 
relate to “an election”, as the SEC held in a letter ruling, but related to 
the election process in general, and thus could not be properly excluded 
from the corporate proxy.135 
Additionally, the SEC instituted a proposal to explicitly allow 
shareholder nominations to the corporate ballot under a new Rule 14a-
11 in 2003, which has since stalled in the review process.136 The 
proposed rule would have required companies to include between one 
and three nominees of holders of at least 5% of all outstanding shares 
(for 2 years) if one of two triggers applied : i)at least 35% of shareholders 
previously withheld support for a board nominee or ii)a majority of 
shareholders voted to be governed by14a-11.137 
Shareholder bylaws regarding nominations would still need to be 
legal under state corporation law.  The Delaware legislature seems to 
 
131 SEC Release Nos. 34-48626 (Oct. 14, 2003). 
132 Exchange Act Rule 14a-3(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (2004). 
133 McDonnell, Brett, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills,
3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 205, *211 (December 2005). 
134 This includes proposals that relate to an election, are improper under state law, have 
been substantially implemented by the company, or conflict with the company’s own 
proposal on the current ballot, among other exclusions.  See Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, 
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2004) 
135American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. American Intern. 
Group, Inc., 462 F.3d 121, *128  (2d Cir. 2006). (“Thus, we cannot agree with the 
second half of the SEC's interpretation of the 1976 Statement: that a proposal may be 
excluded under Rule 14a8(i)(8) if it would simply establish a process for shareholders 
to wage a future election contest.”). 
136 See Proposed Rule 14a-11.  See also Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. 
Reg. at 60,784-85; See also Staff Report: Review of the Proxy Process Regarding the 
Nomination and Election of Directors, July 15, 2003, p. 1. 
137 See proposed Rule 14a-11(a)(2)(i); 14a-11(a)(2)(ii); 14a-11(b); 14a-11(d). 
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have presumptively blessed the legality of shareholder bylaws requiring 
removal upon a majority withhold vote, so clearly a shareholder bylaw 
will not be held illegal simply for relating to the election process for 
Delaware Corporations.  However, this does not guarantee that all 
iterations of shareholder nomination bylaws that are included on the 
corporate ballot will be enforceable under Delaware law.138 
However, presuming that shareholders will manage to achieve the 
holy grail of corporate ballot access through one of these two SEC 
venues, either through SEC action under 14a-11 that will restrict 
corporate discretion to exclude shareholder nominees, or under a 
shareholder approved bylaw that survives the scrutiny of the Delaware 
courts, the withhold vote bylaw will interact with nominations to 
potentially flip the empowerment debate on its side.  In the event that a 
company’s board became host to an insurgent nominee, that managed 
to win by a mere plurality, the company could use a withhold vote 
campaign to remove that director from its board in a successive election.  
Management would effectively be able to institute a withhold vote 
campaign against insurgent directors elected by a plurality vote in a 
contested election, but whose motives seem suspect to a majority of 
shareholders voting in a subsequent election.  
 
Conversely, an institutional investor could potentially overcome the 
holdover rule by a combination withhold vote/insurgent nominee 
campaign over two successive annual meetings.  The withhold vote 
campaign is muted by the phenemona were a director may lose a 
majority, but maintain his seat until a new director can be elected.  
Since, absent a shareholder access rule or bylaw, the replacement 
nominee will usually be hand picked by the board, the director would 
always be replaced with a board nominee.  However, if institutional 
investors are able to win a withhold vote, and then place a nominee on 
the corporate ballot at the next election, the power of the withhold vote 
bylaw would then be enhanced. 
 
C. Rule 452 
 
In addition to SEC regulation of the proxy solicitation process, the 
NYSE regulates proxy voting through rules defining when a broker who 
holds a share on behalf of his client (in “street name”) may vote that 
client’s shares.139 Brokers are permitted to vote in the absence of 
directions from the client in the event that the matter is considered 
 
138 Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Just Say Never?" Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-
Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 546 (1997). 
139 See NYSE Rule 452. 
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routine.140 The most compelling justification for allowing brokers to 
vote on behalf of clients is that attaining a quorum would be 
exceedingly difficult if broker held shares went uncounted.141 
Historically, Rule 452 classified uncontested elections of directors as 
routine.142 However, in response to a growing use of withhold vote 
campaigns and shareholder activism, the NYSE commissioned a 
working group to study the issue which recommended that uncontested 
elections be classified as non-routine, meaning brokers could not vote 
those shares on behalf of their client in an uncontested election.143 That 
recommendation is on the verge of being instituted. 
 
The ability of brokers to vote shares held in street name has 
dramatic implications for the dynamics of withhold vote campaigns, a 
factor the NYSE considered in their exploration of the rule change.144 By 
some estimates, 70-80% of all publicly traded shares are held in street 
name.145 Brokers typically vote in favor of management re-election and 
in favor of management proposals.146 For instance, if broker votes had 
not been counted in the Eisner withhold vote campaign, Eisner would 
have only received 45% in favor of his re-election and a majority of 
 
140 Rule 452 states, “Voting procedure without instructions: A member organization 
which has transmitted proxy soliciting material to the beneficial owner of stock or to an 
investment adviser, registered either under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 or 
under the laws of a state, who exercises investment discretion pursuant to an advisory 
contract for the beneficial owner and has been designated in writing by the beneficial 
owner of such stock (hereinafter “designated investment adviser”) to receive soliciting 
material in lieu of the beneficial owner and solicited voting instructions in accordance 
with the provisions of Rule 451, and which has not received instructions from the 
beneficial owner or from the beneficial owner’s designated investment adviser by the 
date specified in the statement accompanying such material, may give or authorize the 
giving of a proxy to vote such stock, provided the person in the member organization 
giving or authorizing the giving of the proxy has no knowledge of any contest as to the 
action to be taken at the meeting and provided such action is adequately disclosed to 
stockholders and does not include authorization for a merger, consolidation or any other 
matter which may affect substantially the rights or privileges of such stock.” 
141 See NYSE Report at 12. 
142 Rule 452.11(2) defines a ‘‘contest’’ as a matter that ‘‘is the subject of a counter-
solicitation, or is part of aproposal made by a stockholder which is being opposed by 
management.” 
143 Report and Recommendations of the Proxy Working Group to the New York Stock 
Exchange.  June 5, 2006.  available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/PWG_REPORT.pdf.  
[hereinafter “NYSE Report”]. 
144 NYSE Report at 13. 
145 “The majority of publicly traded shares are not registered in companies’ records in
the names of the beneficial owners. Instead, an estimated 70 to 80 percent of all public 
companies’ shares are held in “street name,” meaning that they are held of record by 
brokers, banks or their depositories.” NYSE Report at 10. 
146 See NYSE Report at 14. 
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votes withheld.147 The NYSE working group estimated that, in 2004 
alone, elimination of street voting would have meant 32 directors of 
publicly held companies would have failed to obtain a majority vote in 
favor of their re-election.148 The NYSE Working Group remained 
cognizant of the effect the rule change would have on the costs of 
corporate elections, from increasing influence of special interest groups 
to increasing the cost of campaigns due to a renewed need to increase 
shareholder participation.149 However, it recommended this move as 
vital to enhancing corporate accountability and the transparency of the 
election process.150 
C. Online Solicitation 
 
Yet another element of securities law affecting majority voting is the 
SEC’s policy shift to allow online proxy solicitation.151 The SEC 
approved a proposal on December 13, 2006 to allow electronic delivery 
of proxy materials by anyone soliciting proxies through a model 
utilizing notice and access.152 A proxy solicitor’s obligation to furnish 
proxy materials would, under that rule, be satisfied by posting them to a 
website and sending a notice of their availability, details of the meeting 
and proposal, and contact information for shareholders to request a 
hard copy.153 Currently, the SEC only allows online furnishing of proxy 
materials if the shareholder has previously consented in writing. 154 This 
proposal would significantly reduce the costs of communicating with 
shareholders for anyone interested in soliciting proxies of shareholders, 
including management, insurgent nominees, or institutions running 
withhold vote campaigns.  Since corporate reimbursement of proxy 
costs has traditionally worked to benefit management, the rules 
proposal would alter the balance of power against management in 
proxy fights or withhold vote campaigns. 
 
D. Case in Point:  The Heinz Proxy War: Would You Please Pass the Proxy? 
 
147 See NYSE Report at 9. 
148 See NYSE Report at 13. 
149 See NYSE Report at 21. 
150 See NYSE Report at 21. 
151 See Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, SEC Rel. No. 34-52926 (Dec. 8, 2005)
70 Fed. Reg. 74598.
152 SEC Press Release 2006-209 available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-209.htm. 
153 SEC Press Release. 
154 See SEC Rel. No. 33-7233 (Oct. 6, 1995); Rel. No. 33-7288 (May 9, 1996); Rel. No. 
33-7856 (Apr. 28, 2000).  
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Leading up to its annual meeting in August of 2006, H.J. Heinz 
Co.155 was engaged in the most bitter proxy war in its history.156 
Leading the charge was billionaire investor Nelson Peltz and his activist 
hedge fund, Trian Investment Partners.157 Trian purchased 5.5% of 
Heinz’s outstanding shares and immediately started to rattle the 
saber.158 It submitted SEC filings outlining a plan to save the company 
$575 million; within months Heinz management announced an 
alternative plan.159
The annual election became a referendum on the insurgent’s 
plan.  Five seats were up for election on the twelve member board.  
Peltz offered five candidates, including himself, 3 allies and, for good 
measure, former pro-golfer Greg Norman.  The institutional investors 
were divided:  Calpers and PNC Financial announced that they would 
vote for re-election of all of Heinz’s current board.160 ISS, however, 
urged its institutional investor clients to accept three from Peltz’s slate 
(including Norman).161 Pelz’s speech at the annual meeting was 
compared to the famous Gordon Gekko diatribe in the movie Wall 
Street.162 Capital Research and Associates (a large mutual fund family), 
owning 13% of Heinz stock, was the likely swing vote that would carry 
the day.163 
155 Though H.J. Heinz is not a Delaware corporation, the pertinent operation of majority 
vs. plurality voting, and the process of a proxy fight, would remain the same if it were 
incorporated in Delaware. 
156 Lisa Gewirtz, “Heinz, Anticipation Still Buzzword” The Daily Deal, August 17, 
2006, also available as 2006 WLNR 14215438. 
157 Id. Pelz is one of the more prolific activist hedge fund in the space, with a previous 
victory against Wendy’s and a looming war against Tribune Co, see Los Angeles 
Times, 8/17/06, 2006 WLNR 14218025.  
158 Id.
159 See Gerwitz, supra.
160 Gerwitz, supra. 
161 Id. 
162 “When a reporter asked him if he considered his speech during the meeting "his 
Gordon Gekko moment"--a reference to Michael Douglas' classic "Greed is good" 
speech in the 1980s-era movie "Wall Street"--Peltz was not amused. “That doesn't 
warrant a response," he said frostily.  Instead, Peltz sought to emphasize that he and his 
partners are interested in helping fix companies and participating in their growth--not 
tearing them down or flipping them for a quick profit.  O’Neal, Michael.  “Pelz group 
preaches its Gospel of Truth,” Chicago Tribune, August 17, 2006, also available as 
2006 WLNR 14251264. See also opening quotation, supra. 
163 Lisa Gerwitz, “Heinz Vote May Hinge On One Firm” The Daily Deal, August 18, 
2006.  
33 Pandora’s Ballot Box, or a Proxy with Moxie? 
The result: the insurgents were 2 for 5, Peltz and associate 
Michael Weinstein were elected over two of the board’s candidates, and 
the management slate was 3 for 5.164 At the time of the proxy fight, 
Heinz had a full plurality voting regime, but in November of 2006 they 
adopted majority voting for uncontested elections.165 This means that, 
provided the new board members turn out to be inimical to a majority 
of the institutional investors, a distinct possibility given the divisive 
nature of the proxy fight, the board could institute a majority withhold 
vote campaign against them.  If Calpers is amenable, a board initiated 
withhold vote may prove successful in ousting the Trian directors.  Of 
course, the holdover rule would allow the directors to remain if they 
have not submitted previous resignation policies.  But it is certainly 
interesting that majority voting would give management an 
entrenchment tool in situations such as these. 
 
VI. Implementation of Majority Voting and Its Many Iterations 
 
Corporations have been in a rush to implement some form of 
majority voting even before the adoption of the Delaware 
amendments.166 More than 120 companies had some form of majority 
voting related provision, predominately in the form of director 
resignation policies, as of March 2006.167 But the question is, if plurality 
voting is more likely to allow management to control the election, then 
what would explain the lack of resistance?  Three possibilities come to 
mind:  i) firms want to adopt a lighter version of the majority voting 
standard, and then keep shareholder versions of a similar bylaw off of 
the corporate ballot under SEC Rule 14(a)(8) or simply steal the thunder 
from an alternate campaign, ii) firms anticipate that majority voting 
may have the converse result of helping them to fend off divisive 
directors proposed under a shareholder nomination rule, if the SEC’s 
ongoing exploration of this issue eventually yields results, or iii) firms 
 
164 See Heinz Press Release, September 8, 2006, “Heinz Announces Preliminary Proxy 
Voting Results; Looks Forward with Confidence to Executing Its Plans to Increase 
Shareholder Value” available at http://www.heinz.com/News_f.aspx. 
165 Heinz Board Approves Majority Voting, Morningstar News Service, November 8, 
2006, available at 
http://news.morningstar.com/news/ViewNews.asp?article=/BW/20061108006002_univ
.xml&pgid=qtqnPress5.   
166 TAKEOVER LAW AND PRACTICE 2006  1571 PLI/Corp 259, *278 (“In June 
2005, Pfizer Inc. became the first company to amend its corporate governance 
guidelines to require that any director who receives a majority of withheld votes submit 
his or her resignation to the board, leaving the outcome in the hands of the board. Since 
then, Walt Disney, Office Depot, Circuit City, Lucent Technologies, and over 30 other 
companies have adopted similar guidelines.”). 
167 See Dennis Berman, Boardroom Defensetration—As Proxy Season Heats Up, 
Companies Consider Rules to Boot Unwanted Directors,” Wall Street Journal, Mar. 16, 
2006, at B1.  
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are actually interested in improving their corporate governance 
apparatus in order to satisfy institutional investors.168 
The question of using a policy to keep shareholder bylaws off the 
ballot under Rule 14(a)(8) has been answered by the SEC in the 
negative.169 However, SEC letter rulings on Rule 14, as we have seen in 
AFSCME v. AIG, are not necessarily dispositive and challenges to it in 
federal court could be seen in future contests.  Further, an open question 
also remains as to whether a majority voting bylaw adopted by the 
Board, that provides wider board discretion in responding to a 
successful withhold vote, would keep an alternative bylaw proposal off 
the ballot.170 However, the primary advantage to having a policy 
already in place is that it makes a contest to institute an alternative new 
bylaw more difficult to win.  During the 2006 Proxy season, 86% of 
majority voting proposals, put forward where no majority voting 
governance policy was currently in place, were successful.171 
Alternatively, only 18% of proposals passed where a company had 
previously adopted a Pfizer Governance Policy.172 
A. Mechanical Issues in Tallying the Voting Outcome 
 
The DGCL provides that “In the absence of such specification in the 
certificate of incorporation or bylaws of the corporation…Directors shall 
be elected by a plurality of the votes of the shares present in person or 
represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on the election 
of directors.”173 This seemingly straightforward definition of how a vote 
 
168 ISS has indicated that it may decline to endorse a campaign for a majority voting 
bylaw in instances where a proposal has already been adopted that substantially 
implemented majority voting. 
169 Capital One Financial Corporation, SEC Letter Opinion, 2006 WL 129325, *1 
(January 16, 2006). 
170 See Exchange Act Release No. 34-20091 (Aug. 16, 1983). See also Texaco, Inc., 
SEC No-Action Letter (March 28, 1991) ("a determination that the Company has 
substantially implemented the proposal depends on whether its particular policies, 
practices and procedures compare favorably with the guidelines of the proposal.").  In 
the context of majority voting proposals, See Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, SEC No-
Action Letter, (February 14, 2005) where a stockholder proposal for a "simple majority 
vote" was properly excluded as "substantially implemented" under Rule 14a-8(i)(10) 
where the registrant was engaged in the process of removing supermajority voting 
provisions from its governing documents.  Compare KeySpan Corporation, SEC No-
Action Letter, 2006 WL 626123 (March 7, 2006). 
171 See Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen, & Katz Client memo (white paper), Majority Voting - 
A look back at the 2006 proxy season.  June 12, 2006. page 1. 
172 See Section infra. 
173 8 Del. C. § 216. 
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should be tallied, placing in the denominator the number of shares 
present in person or represented by proxy and entitled to vote in the 
election of directors, is subject to a surprisingly tangled web of case law 
defining its application. 174 For instance, any shares present that are 
entitled to vote, but do not vote in the election for some reason, would 
end up increasing the number of affirmative votes necessary to elect a 
director in a majority voting regime (by increasing the denominator) 
and would also count as no votes (by being placed in the numerator).175 
This issue becomes particularly interesting in the context of broker 
street voting.  Berlin v. Emerald176 outlines the various situations in 
which shares are counted in the denominator and which are not in 
determining voting outcomes.177 To the extent that shareholders give 
their brokers directions on how to vote, even if that instruction is 
precisely not to vote or to abstain, those shares are counted in the 
denominator under Delaware law.178 Where voting in uncontested 
elections was previously deemed discretionary by the NYSE, broker 
street votes were counted in the denominator of shares entitled to vote, 
even if the beneficial shareholders gave no instruction to their broker.   
 
174 By way of contrast, New York law uses as its metric a much simpler “votes cast” 
denominator.  See Bank of New York Co. v. Irving Bank Corp., 531 N.Y.S.2d 730 
(N.Y.Sup.Ct.1988), aff'd, 533 N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y.App.1988). 
175 Licht v. Storage Technology Corp.,  2005 WL 1252355, at *1 (Del.Ch. May 6, 2005) 
citing R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, § 7.25, at 7-51 (2004) (“[I]n 
determining whether a [shareholder] proposal has passed in a circumstance where the 
vote is required “a majority of the shares present and entitled to vote on the subject 
matter,” abstentions ··· are to be treated as shares present and “entitled to vote on the 
subject matter.” Applying that standard, an abstention would be counted as a “no” 
vote····”). 
176 Berlin v. Emerald Partners, 552 A.2d 482, *494 (Del.,1988) (“Delaware law 
expressly recognizes the right of the corporation to rely upon record ownership, not 
beneficial ownership, in determining who is entitled to notice of and to vote at the 
meetings of stockholders. Therefore, from the perspective of the Delaware corporation, 
a broker who is the stockholder of record, has the legal authority to vote in person or by 
proxy on all matters. Nevertheless, the relationship between a broker, who is the 
“record owner”, and the beneficial owner is governed by the rules of the various stock 
exchanges…The shares represented by a limited proxy cannot be considered as part of 
the voting power present on a nondiscretionary proposal from which power has been 
withheld by crossing it out or otherwise.”) (Citations omitted).   
177 The Chancery Court has applied the test outlined in Berlin to interpret the “entitled 
to vote” language in Section 216.  See Hammersmith v. Elmhurst-Chicago Stone Co., 
1989 WL 99129, at *3 (Del Ch. Aug. 17, 1989). 
178 North Fork Bancorpation., Inc. v. Toal, 825 A.2d 860 (Del. Ch.2000), aff'd, Dime 
Bancorporation, Inc. v. North Fork Bancorporation, Inc., 781 A.2d 693 (Del.2001) 
(TABLE). 
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So, effectively, the alteration to Rule 452179 to make voting in 
uncontested elections non-discretionary will mean that not only will 
there be fewer brokers voting in the affirmative for management 
candidates in the numerator, but there will also be fewer votes tallied in 
the total denominator.  This will result in fewer withhold votes required 
to achieve a majority withhold vote for withhold vote campaigns 
against directors of Delaware corporations.  The specter of this double 
whammy effect was not mentioned in the NYSE report, and it is 
uncertain whether that phenomenon was brought to their attention.180 
Moderating this analysis is the fact that Delaware law merely 
provides a default provision for determining voting outcomes.181 
Adopting a bylaw that simplifies the process of counting votes, and 
addresses the complications inherent in a majority voting situation, 
would greatly simplify the question.  Perhaps, in the aftermath of Rule 
452 and the Delaware Amendment, boards will have a reason to explore 
alternative arrangements.182 
B. The Various Bylaw Strategies 
 
1) The Pfizer Governance Policy183 
Pfizer included within its governance principles (and not the 
charter or bylaws) a provision that, in any uncontested election in which 
a nominee receives a greater number of withhold votes than for votes 
that nominee must immediately offer their resignation to the board.  
Then, the Corporate Governance Committee, without participation of 
the director against whom the withhold vote campaign was instituted, 
will make a recommendation to the Board as to whether action is 
required.  The Board is then required to act within 90 days of receipt of 
the recommendation.  Most companies implementing the Pfizer 
approach have defined a successful withhold vote as a majority of 
shares voting, rather than outstanding.184 A few, however, have used 
 
179 See Section V B supra. 
180 See NYSE Report.  The Report mentions that elimination of affirmative broker votes 
would have had a profound effect on the outcomes of majority withhold vote 
campaigns.  However, it stands to reason that the calculation, if it omitted the double 
whammy effect of Berlin v. Emerald, significantly underestimated the consequences of 
the alteration to Exchange Rule 452. 
181 Licht at 3. 
182 And Institutional Investors and other activists will also have an incentive to monitor 
those arrangements, or propose their own alternatives. 
183 Also known as the Intel strategy, as Intel was the first to adopt it. 
184 See, e.g., Intel Corporation Bylaw Article III Section 1 available at 
http://www.intel.com/intel/finance/docs/bylaws.pdf. 
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the more onerous “majority of shares outstanding” approach.  Over 100 
companies have adopted the Pfizer Governance Policy approach. 
 
This approach has been uniquely unpopular with institutional investors, 
and would be unlikely to convince many of them against supporting an 
alternative majority voting bylaw.185 However, it seems that instituting 
such a policy is helpful in preventing the efficacy of a campaign to 
install alternative bylaws.  One relevant question would be how 
Delaware case law would treat a decision to reject a director’s 
nomination under a modified plurality Pfizer Plan.  Most business 
decisions receive business judgment review, but where a board acts for 
the sole or primary purpose of perpetuating its own control, this 
improper motive overrides the ordinary protection of the business 
judgment rule.186 If the board’s rejection is perceived to be for such an 
entrenchment purpose, and no other reason, it may be subject to 
enhanced scrutiny. 
 
2) The GE Bylaw 
 
GE requires that any director nominee that receives more 
withhold votes than affirmative votes in an uncontested election 
immediately tender their resignation.187 A process is established for the 
board to then consider that resignation, in similar fashion to the Pfizer 
Policy.  The difference is that the language of the bylaw clearly outlines 
that “Absent a compelling reason for the director to remain on the 
Board, the Board shall accept the resignation”.188 
3) The Bebchuk Bylaw 
 
Professor Bebchuk’s proposal, contained in General Dynamics 
2006 proxy statement, is a bylaw providing that a director candidate be 
ineligible to stand for election if he or she received more withheld votes 
than for votes in an immediately preceding uncontested election.189 
Though it failed to pass, it received a 37.9% favorable vote.190 
185 Indeed, ISS has openly stated that it will push for recommend voting for an 
alternative bylaw in the event that a company has adopted the Pfizer Policy approach. 
186 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., Del.Supr., 493 A.2d 946 (1985); Aronson 
v. Lewis, Del.Supr., 473 A.2d 805 (1984). 
187 Article II C.  Bylaws of the General Electric Company, available at 
http://www.ge.com/en/citizenship/governance/bylaws/index.htm. 
188 Id. 
189 Company proxy Statement of General Dynamics.  Page 38.  Available on EDGAR at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40533/000119312506069331/ddef14a.htm#tx
18358_15 
190 Wachtell Lipton white paper majority voting at A-2. 
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Interestingly, General Dynamics inserted an announcement of its just 
adopted Pfizer Policy just below the section of its Proxy Statement 
recommending a no vote on the Bebchuk bylaw.191 
C. The sobering effect of the holdover rule, the staggered board, and board 
replacement or resignation rejection. 
 
The holdover rule dams the tide of horrible outcomes put forward 
by the traditionalist apologists.  Delaware Corporate law provides that 
“Each director shall hold office until such director's successor is elected 
and qualified or until such director's earlier resignation or removal.”192
The significance of this provision depends on the type of majority 
provision in place.  If the board or the shareholders have adopted a 
bylaw requiring the removal of a director that has failed to obtain a 
majority vote, then the effect of the holdover rule would be that a 
director who fails to obtain such a vote in an uncontested election may 
stay on as a director until a new director can be found by the board.  If, 
as in the GE bylaw, automatic resignation is required, then the holdover 
rule is inapplicable.  In the case of a Pfizer policy, the holdover rule will 
be unnecessary as the Board can conceivably decide not to remove the 
director.  The Bebchuk Bylaw realistically takes into account the effect of 
the holdover rule by only requiring a director targeted by a successful 
withhold vote to stand down from running in the next successive 
election. 
 
Should Delaware at least allow the shareholders to amend the 
bylaws to immediately require removal of holdover directors, in order 
for 15 to apply?  Some provisions in the DGCL are merely defaults that 
bylaws can alter at will, some are mandatory.193 The distinction 
between them is subject to a multi-factor test.194 The equal dignities rule 
may, nonetheless, allow a bylaw to conflict with other provisions.195 
191 See General Dynamics Proxy Statement, supra, at 39. 
192 8 Del C 141(b). 
193 Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Industries, 501 A.2d 401, *407 (Del.,1985) (“The bylaws of 
a corporation are presumed to be valid, and the courts will construe the bylaws in a 
manner consistent with the law rather than strike down the bylaws... A bylaw that is 
inconsistent with any statute or rule of common law, however, is void; see Kerbs v. 
California Eastern Airways, Inc., Del.Supr., 90 A.2d 652, 659 (1952), and bylaws must 
be reasonable in their application. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., Del.Supr., 285 
A.2d 437 (1971); State v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., Del.Supr., 77 A. 16 
(1910).”)(some citations omitted). 
194 Jones Apparel Group, Inc. v. Maxwell Shoe Co., 883 A.2d 837 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
195 Under the so called equal dignities doctrine, “the general theory of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law is that action taken under one section of that law is not 
legally dependent, and its validity is not dependent upon, nor to be tested by the 
requirements of other unrelated sections under which the same result might be obtained 
by different means.” Orzek v. Englehart 195 A.2d 375 (Del. 1963).  This has been 
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Furthermore, a bylaw which interferes with what is understood to be 
the traditional province of the Board will be struck down.196 The next 
question is whether to make a bylaw altering the holdover rule, once 
approved by the shareholders, unalterable by the Board without 
shareholder approval.197 Presently it is unclear whether bylaw 
provisions which purport to prohibit the board from altering or 
amending them are effective.198 A board may be constrained in its 
ability to unilaterally remove bylaws adopted by shareholders by 
 
applied to bylaw amendments in Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 20 
(Del. Ch. Feb. 7, 2000). 
196 Coffee explores four dimensions that seem to indicate whether a bylaw restricting 
the power of the board might be upheld. See John Coffee, The Bylaw Battlefield: Can 
Institutions Change the outcome of Corporate Control Contests?. Coffee, 51 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 605 (1997). Those are i)Ordinary vs. Fundamental-courts are more likely to 
allow bylaws that affect fundamental changes to the corporation, but not day to day 
business decisions ii)Orders vs. Constraints-courts prefer shareholder restrain boards 
from certain actions by requiring shareholder approval than mandating that they take 
specified actions.  iii)Procedure vs. Substance. Bylaws necessarily codify and express 
the corporation's "housekeeping" and procedural rules, but rarely address specific 
substantive decisions iv)Corporate Governance vs. Business Decisions- bylaws are 
most viable where they generally re-allocate authority between shareholders and boards 
than when they affect specific instances of that authority. 
197 Thought unclear, directors may have the authority to unilaterally eliminate bylaws 
not otherwise protected by the DGCL.  See General DataComm Industries, Inc. v. State 
of Wisconsin Investment Board, 731 A.2d 818 (Del. Ch. 1999) (noting, in the context of 
a motion for expedited proceedings, that “the question of whether a stockholder-
approved bylaw can be repealed by a board of directors with such authority has not 
clearly been answered by a Delaware Court.  However, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Centaur Partners and the views of a learned commentator (Hamermesh) suggest that 
the affirmative answer may be the correct one.”). See American Int’l Rent a Car, Inc. v. 
Cross, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 413 (Del. Ch. 1984) (Berger, V.C.) (“If a majority of 
American International's stockholders in fact disapproved of the Board's amendment of 
the bylaw, several recourses were, and continue to be, available to them. They could 
vote the incumbent directors out of office. Alternatively, they could cause a special 
meeting of the stockholders to be held for the purpose of amending the bylaws and, as 
part of the amendment, they could remove from the Board the power to further amend 
the provision in question.”) (emphasis added). 
198 Coates and Faris consider the issue in some depth.  John Coates and Bradley C. 
Faris, Second-Generation Shareholder Bylaws: Post Quickturn Alternatives 56 BUS.
LAW. 1323, at n. 200 (2001).  In their view, the “best response is that Section 109(a) of 
DGCL reserves to the shareholders the residual authority to adopt, amend, and repeal 
bylaws.  If the shareholders’ residual authority under Section 109(a) is to mean 
anything, the argument would go, it must mean that the shareholders may adopt a bylaw 
that is beyond board repeal.”  However, they also argue that courts would likely find a 
non-repeal provision illegal, despite this argument.  Nonetheless, they believe that a 
similar restriction on repeal, such as a unanimous vote provision, would be evaluated in 
the same way as any other limiting provision, and thus could be upheld. They s also 
note possible ways to uphold a no-repeal provision, either by arguing that the repeal of 
the bylaw is a violation of fiduciary duty, or that it is a Blasius like disenfranchisement 
of the shareholders.  Cf. Larry Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-
Adopted By-laws: Taking Back the Street? 73 TUL. L. REV. 409 (1998). 
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fiduciary duty obligations,199 but fortifying holdover alterations into the 
DGCL, like the concrete provision for majority voting, would ensure 
that boards would not meddle with it.  An alternative approach would 
be to require a replacement be found within a certain time frame, as the 
MBCA offers.   
 
Or, if you like sneaky lawyer tricks, how about simply trying the 
following:  if the shareholders were to adopt, in the same bylaw that 
specifies the number of votes required for election, a provision that “In 
the event that a director standing for an uncontested election fails to 
obtain a majority of the votes cast in their favor, a written consent from 
shareholders constituting 20% of the total shares voting in that election 
shall be sufficient to require that director’s immediate removal” or 
something similar.  The iterations are limitless; the point though, is that 
arguably the holdover rule repeal would be contained in a bylaw 
already entrenched by the new majority voting amendment requiring 
that “A bylaw amendment adopted by stockholders which specifies the 
votes that shall be necessary for the election of directors shall not be 
further amended or repealed by the board of directors.”200 It doesn’t say 
that the bylaw amendment cannot include provisions beyond the votes 
necessary provision, and it would literally read that the entire bylaw 
would be unalterable.   
 
By way of complicating this question even further, if a director 
receives a majority withhold vote, and remains protected by the 
holdover rule, there is no way to replace that director in the interim 
between the next election if he/she is unwilling to go.  The other 
directors have no authority to remove a director.201 Another relevant 
question will be: Who gets to replace a removed director?  The default is 
that a director may be replaced by a vote of a majority of the other 
directors, but the firms’ charter will control the question.202 If the Board 
has the authority to do so, then it may mute the effect of a successful 
withhold vote.  For instance, a removed Chairman could simply have 
the Board appoint a director amenable to their aims if the target Board 
were truly dysfunctional.   
 
Some would argue that the presence of a staggered board would 
also make majority voting less effective.  As of 2005, 53% of the top 5,000 
 
199 Hollinger Int'l Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1078 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff'd, 872 A.2d 
559 (2005). 
200 8 Del.C. § 216 
201 Rodman Ward, Edward P. Welch & Andrew S. Turezyn, Folk on the Delaware 
General Corporation Law, § 141.5.4 at GCL-4-161; See also Bruch v. National 
Guarantee Credit Corp., 116 A. 738 (Del Ch. 1922). 
202 8 Del. C. § 223(d) 
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U.S. Corporations by size had classified boards, meaning that the 
directors are divided into groups of three and run in staggered years.203 
The practical effect of this practice is that it would take two successive 
elections to replace a majority of the board, thus serving as a means to 
entrench the present management.  The presence of a staggered board 
also minimizes the effectiveness of a withhold vote campaign, as it will 
mean that at most a third of the board could be removed at a time under 
either a majority voting bylaw or a resignation policy.  Indeed, ISS is 
concerned that a negative drawback to the majority voting movement 
will be a diminished willingness on the part of firms to declassify their 
boards.204 If the aim of majority voting is to replace the whole board, 
then staggering is an issue.  However, the flip is that the presence of 
staggered boards may lessen board resistance to majority voting bylaws. 
 
E. The Strategy of the Stalking Horse Candidate205 
An idea heretofore unexplored in the literature, that would 
presumably be effective to halt completely the operation of a bylaw 
requiring majority voting in uncontested elections, would be to 
artificially create a contested election in advance of a threatened vote.  
Management could enlist a dummy candidate to add to the corporate 
ballot to make the number of nominees for the election exceed the 
number of seats up for election.  The existence of such a strategy would 
mean that shareholder advocates would need to ensure an advance 
resignation policy were in place in order to outflank a stalking horse 
maneuver.   
 
VII. An Analysis of Voting Outcomes Using an Analogy to Political 
Science 
 
The debate between plurality and majority voting schemes was 
originally sired in the context of political representation.  Analysis in 
that sphere typically revolves around four distinct criterion.206 The first 
factor is decisiveness, or the existence of a clear outcome at the final 
 
203 ISS Report, supra, at 15. 
204 Id.
205 The term stalking horse originally derived from hunting wildfowl. Sportsmen 
observed that birds flee on the approach of humans, but tolerate the presence of other 
animals, such as horses.  Hunters would approach their quarry by walking alongside 
their horses, keeping their upper bodies out of sight until the flock was within range. 
Animals trained for this purpose are called stalking horses.  
206 Miller, Nicholas R. Voting.  From Eatwell, John, Murray Milgate, and Peter 
Newman, eds., The New Plagrave: a Dictionary of Economics, Vol. 4, London, 
Macmillan, 1988: Pages 826-830.  Citing May, K. (1952) A set of independent 
necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority rule, Econometrica, January. 
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round of voting.207 The second is anonymity of voters, meaning that we 
do not need to know who cast which votes to determine the outcome.208 
Neutrality is a third criterion, the voting result should be such that if 
everyone voted in the opposite fashion, then the other alternative would 
win (a criterion which becomes particularly cogent in the event that 
multiple alternatives are put forward, and the number of alternatives 
presented is greater by two or more than the number of selections 
permitted).209 The fourth is positive responsiveness; if alternative A is at 
least tied with B, and someone then changes their vote to make it more 
favorable to A( by either voting for A instead of abstaining, or by 
abstaining instead of voting for B) then A wins.210
In analyzing these four criterion in the corporate context, it would 
seem the anonymity criterion is least important.211 Shareholder votes 
are a matter of corporate record, and the large institutional shareholders 
that will have the most say in withhold vote campaigns typically are 
very vocal about their interest.212 Decisiveness would be especially 
important to the board of directors, an inability to elect directors would 
stifle the board’s ability to act.  Shareholders would share that interest, 
unless one accepts the use of brinksmanship in reform negotiations (see 
analysis concerning a “first strike capability” for institutional 
shareholders above).  I would also add cost as a fifth criterion to analyze 
voting schemes for corporate elections; with fixed corporate resources 
and the voters sharing the cost of incumbent management’s proxy 
solicitations (though not the cost of the challenger, unless they are 
victorious), shareholder voters would benefit from a cost efficient voting 
method. 
 
Majority voting is the optimal method for a choice between two 
outcomes.213 However, when the alternatives extend beyond a single 
binary choice, the analysis becomes increasingly complex.  Some form of 
plurality voting must be utilized in order to achieve the decisiveness 
criterion, but the ordering of alternatives, the ordering of rounds of 
voting, and the inclusion of non-viable alternatives can all be used to 
game the outcome in favor of an alternative which may not be 
 
207 Id at 827. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. 
211 Indeed, some would argue that hidden voting is dangerous.  See note 116, supra,
citing Hu and Black. 
212 See, e.g., the Disney withhold vote campaign. 
213 See Miller, supra, at 827. 
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preferred, and in fact might otherwise be rejected, by a majority of the 
voters.214 This outcome violates the positive responsiveness criterion. 
 
Majority voting for uncontested elections of directors, as the bylaws 
adopted in response the majority voting movement provide, would 
enhance the ability of corporate plurality elections to achieve the four 
criterion ex post (and perhaps years later) by giving voters an 
opportunity to eliminate directors for which a majority of the electorate 
would express a clear preference against.  In effect, the ability of a 
majority of shareholders to express a “withhold” or no vote against an 
incumbent director would allow the voters to mop up the results that 
spring from a weakness in the plurality voting scheme by eliminating 
directors elected only because of a lack of alternatives or because of a 
gamed process in the subsequent round of voting. 
 
The solution that political systems in the United States have 
discovered for the purposes of state wide elections is a compromise 
between plurality and majority voting: the runoff election, with a 
plurality election followed by a majority election for the top two vote 
recipients.215 In that system, decisiveness is achieved, as you eliminate 
the instance of a single candidate failing to win a majority in a race 
between three or more.  You also minimize gamesmanship and the 
attendant risk to the neutrality criterion, as the winner of the runoff 
must be ultimately selected by a majority of the electorate. 
 
Runoff elections may be a useful addition to tools of the shareholder 
democracy movement.  The most significant roadblock to any reform of 
the corporate election process is the additional cost of the replacement 
system.216 However, the SEC’s current rule change to allow proxy 
solicitation via mere postcard notice, combined with internet access to 
the full proxy, should reduce the cost of contested elections for both 
corporations and challengers.217 Furthermore, putting a runoff bylaw to 
a shareholder vote would allow shareholders to decide if the added cost 
 
214 For the seminal work on why voting systems are incapable of meeting all necessary 
criterion at once, See Arrow, Kenneth.  "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare", 
The Journal of Political Economy, Volume 58, Issue 4 (August, 1950), pp. 328–346. 
215 Also of interest are the various systems of tournament elimination used in sports 
playoffs, not analyzed in this context in light of the excessive cost they would require 
for corporate elections. 
216Opponents of any change in corporate elections would doubtless add a sixth criterion 
involving fiduciary duty; that the voting scheme cannot result in election of a director 
that would put his own interest before that of the corporation and its fellow 
shareholders.  I do not include such a criterion for two reasons: such risk is not 
intimately related to the form of election, and is also more properly addressed in the 
fiduciary duty strictures of shareholder derivative suits.  
217 http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-209.htm 
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of a runoff election for directors is worth their while. Besides, it is 
supposedly a rare occurrence anyway.  I do not mean to suggest that 
runoffs are appropriate for every company, or that this analysis is 
exhaustive.  However, runoffs in the context of contested corporate 
elections is a concept that has thus far been wrongfully left off the table 
of alternatives discussed in the shareholder democracy debate. 
 
Some would argue that a comparison to democratic regimes is 
inappropriate, as voting in the corporate context, governed as it is by 
freedom of contract and transferability of rights, is simply too different 
for rational comparison to other systems.218 However, I would note that 
companies have used comparison to the plurality standard to justify 
plurality voting.219 
VIII. Conclusion and Predictions 
 
Supporters of the majority voting amendment include a unique 
cast; including SEC Chairman Cox, Ira Milstein,220 a number of Unions, 
CalPERs, Professors Grundfest and Bebchuk, and former Delaware 
Chief Justice Norm Veasey.221 However, the purple haze surrounding 
the multi-layered reforms, recently initiated at the federal level and the 
exchanges, that have affected or will affect the efficacy of withhold vote 
campaigns, combined with the proximity of this change to the still 
recent wave of reform flowing form Sarbanes Oxley and its regulatory 
cousins, calls for a cooling off period before we stretch the analogy of 
corporate democracy too far.  The working parts of corporate and 
securities law will interact in ways that are as yet incompletely 
understood in the context of withhold votes, so perhaps we should 
merely keep a keen eye on the golden goose for awhile and give the 
regulatory engines a rest.  In that vein, rather than advocate for a 
particular alternative proposal related to the shareholder democracy 
movement, or for a rollback of the reforms already instituted, or even 
attempt to justify the reform movement, the conclusion of this 
examination will be simply a few predictions about developments that 
can be reasonably expected in the near term.  
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Henry Manne, January 2, 2007. 
219 See General Dynamics Proxy Statement, supra, at 39 “This proposal would require 
that director nominees receive the support of a majority of votes cast to be elected. For 
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reasons that democracies use plurality standards.” 
220 See ISS Report, supra. 
221 Id. 
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1) It is likely that the next move is for institutional investors to rally for an 
amendment to the DGCL to permit shareholders to adopt a bylaw altering the 
holdover rule, and making such a rule, once adopted, similarly unalterable by 
the board absent shareholder ratification. 
 
2) Expect hedge funds to take an active role in withhold vote campaigns for 
firms that have adopted such a policy, but not to take an active role in fighting 
to get a strong majority voting amendment into the bylaws as that would make 
board seats won in proxy contest victories more difficult to keep. 
3) Expect litigation in federal courts over whether firms can exclude from the 
corporate ballot under 14a8 shareholder proposals for majority voting where a 
quasi-majority voting rule has already been adopted. 
4) Expect attempts to institute holdover rule bylaws that result in challenges in 
federal courts, or seek declaratory judgments from Delaware Chancery 
Court.222 
5) Expect a withhold vote campaign, in the event that one occurs in the future 
in which the vote is close, to erupt into litigation over whether shares are 
properly counted at “able to vote” for purposes of establishing a majority.223 
6) Expect litigation over a board’s response to any successful withhold vote 
campaigns, especially if its policy or ratified bylaw doesn’t provide with 
specificity a board’s response to a withhold vote campaign.224 
7) In the event that the shareholder access rule is revisited and is a strong as 
before, look for management to institute or threaten withhold vote campaigns 
against insurgency directors.225 
8) Expect that these victories by the shareholder democracy movement will add 
fuel to management decisions to sell out to private equity buyers that do not 
present the difficulties of accountability to disparate financial intermediaries.226 
9) Expect that, as institutional investors gain negotiating leverage through 
victories in the shareholder democracy movement, activist hedge funds will 
 
222 See Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., 2006 WL 1805545 (Del. Ch.  June 22, 2006).  Though 
Bebchuk’s move for a declaratory judgment declaring his bylaw proposal legal in 
Delaware Chancery Court was dismissed for lack of ripeness, this doesn’t mean that 
such challenges will not be likely once such bylaws are approved. 
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proxy cannot exceed 500 words. 
225 See SectionV , supra. 
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make use of that leverage as well and their activity in that space will increase as 
they are able to acquire access to more capital. 
10) Expect that, as financial intermediaries power is linked to flow of capital 
into their coffers, future recessions and major shifts in Federal Reserve policy 
will have an effect on activist investor activity.227 
227 In other words, rattling the saber loses its effectiveness when your opponent knows 
you can’t afford to pay for the war. 
